주메뉴 바로가기내용 바로가기하단 바로가기
상세검색
  • 디렉토리 검색
  • 작성·발신·수신일
    ~
근대한국외교문서

전권사절 임명 이후 조선과 청국의 정세 보고

미국과 청국의 교섭
  • 발신자
    R. W. Shufeldt
  • 수신자
    F. T. Frelinghuysen
  • 발송일
    1882년 1월 23일(음)(1882년 1월 23일)
  • 출전
    NARA II, M 92, R 59; AADM, pp. 914-5.
Sir,

I desire to express my sincere recognition of the great confidence placed in me by the President and the Secretary of State in the appointment forwarded to me by the last American mail as Special Envoy to Corea, with power to make a treaty with that country, and I also wish to thank the Honorable Secretary himself for the encouraging telegram forwarded to me by the U.S. Charge at Peking and received on the 19th inst.—
The instructions accompanying the Commission contain, very properly, a warning against the danger of permitting my zeal to outrun my discretion in the effort to be the first to enter this “forbidden land”-. I hope the Hon. Secretary of State will believe me when I say that I consider the dignity of the Government paramount always to my own advantage.—
A long experience in the East has taught me that nothing gives a Western Nation greater ascendancy than a successful manifestation of its power-, while a failure is never forgotten, and one great obstacle just now in Corea is the memory of the unfortunate issue of our efforts there in 1871.
But the Department will understand that success depends now not so much upon ourselves as upon the critical condition of the relation existing between China and Japan—between which countries Corea is a strategical point— A treaty made by the United States through the influence of China would tend to check the encroachments of Japan, against which China, while possessing the will, lacks the nerve to protest-.
His Excellency Li Hung-chang lends his assistance (without which I doubt if a treaty can be made) for this purpose and not from any desire to advance the interests of the United States in the East. Besides, he fears that some other nation less scrupulous might force these “barred gates”.
Indeed it was his dread of Russia when I visited him in August, 1881, which urged him to offer his cooperation in making a treaty with Corea.—Following this period came the peace with Russia and when I saw him again June 1881, he told me that a treaty was no longer advisable- that the crisis had passed! But very soon afterwards complaints reached the Viceroy of the Japanese aggression in Corea and of the ill-treatment of its people, and then His Excellency again sent for me and said that he had dispatched a messenger to Corea advising a treaty with the United States.
The time he had specified for an answer elapsed while rumors of grievances multiplied.—
During this interval I was consulted about the “Chinese Navy” and my suggestions were adopted to such an extent that it was generally believed the Viceroy intended to place the Squadron belonging to his Province under my charge, and he quite understood from our Minister at Peking that our Government would not be unwilling to have one of its Naval Officers accept such a position—.
However serious the Viceroy may have been in this intention, it became evident in a few months that it would end in frustration-either by the intrigues of foreigners already in and about the Naval Service, or by the pressure of Foreign Representatives from their own countrymen— Under these influences His Excellency, the Viceroy began to grow less communicative on Naval Matters and finally placed me in such a position that I was obliged to decline any further connection with the Navy, or sacrifice the dignity due to my country and myself.
When I chose this alternative I heard no more from His Excellency until just before his departure for Pao-Ting-Fu (the Winter Capital), in December, when he sent me the message by his Naval Secretary which Mr. Holcombe transmitted to you viz:—“that the Corean Government was now willing to make a treaty with the United States and that the Viceroy would send an official with the American Envoy to that country”—This message is the result I have no doubt of a visit from a Corean Envoy who came here and went to Peking some time in the month of October last and I think that in sending it to me the Viceroy had the sanction of Yamên at Peking.
If the condition of things as I have stated them should remain unchanged in Corea until Spring about May 1st proxi—, I think the prospects of a treaty quite favorable-. But as the Department will by that time be in possession of this communication I can readily be advised as to the propriety of prosecuting the mission.
I do not take into account any wish of the Corean Government itself on this question because I believe it will be governed by the advice of Li Hung-chang. I have every reason to believe that the Japanese treaty was made under his sanction.
I speak of the Viceroy in these matters because he is virtually in all foreign affairs the ruler of China. I quite recognize the fact that there is no “urgency” in a treaty with Corea.
It is a poor country and its commerce is of small promise both at present and in future, but it lies in the Ocean highway of nations and must be opened sooner or later; it is a only question whether our Government will take the initiative as it did in Japan or leave to European Powers the prestige which such action will confer upon them. Our ships have almost disappeared from the surface of the sea- Our Navy is fast becoming a tradition, but if our diplomacy can by its moral force gain a point here upon the Pacific, I shall take great satisfaction in my share of the work.
Although the propositions for a Corean treaty were made to me confidentially, yet, I have reason to believe that the same project was submitted to H.B.M’s Minister by H.E.Li Hung-chang.
The Viceroy however prefers the United States because he hopes to see “the opium clause” inserted which England would not agree to and the “religious toleration” question left out which either France or Italy would probably insist upon.
I am inclined to think that an “opium clause” would be very satisfactory to China. His Excellency Li Hung-chang has been informed of my appointment through the Chinese official in charge of foreign affairs at Tientsin.
Rear Admiral Clitz has placed the U.S.S. “Swatara” at my disposal and I have written asking for a meeting to discuss the question of cooperation which I have no doubt will be cordial and effective. I have proposed Chefoo about May 1st prox. or any other point in China during the month of April.
In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of State by the earliest mail acknowledging receipt of the despatches of the Department, I mentioned two or three minor points in the instructions which I respectfully request may meet with your favorable consideration.
I have the honor to be with great respect your obedient service.

R. W. Shufeldt
Commodore U. S. Navy

색인어
이름
Li Hung-chang, Chinese Navy, Holcombe, Li Hung-chang, Li Hung-chang, Li Hung-chang, Clitz, R. W. Shufeldt
지명
Peking, Pao-Ting-Fu, Peking, Peking, Tientsin, Chefoo
오류접수

본 사이트 자료 중 잘못된 정보를 발견하였거나 사용 중 불편한 사항이 있을 경우 알려주세요. 처리 현황은 오류게시판에서 확인하실 수 있습니다. 전화번호, 이메일 등 개인정보는 삭제하오니 유념하시기 바랍니다.

전권사절 임명 이후 조선과 청국의 정세 보고 자료번호 : gk.d_0006_0930