Sir,

Since closing my despatch number 30. in regard to the negotiation of a treaty with Corea, I have become possessed of one or two further items of interesting and, it may be important information bearing upon the subject.
The Viceroy Li Hung-chang is evidently anxious to have treaty relations established between the United States and Corea, and has intimidated that he would send a Chinese official in company with the Commissioner whom the United States may appoint to conduct negotiation.
Professedly, his object in taking such a step is to see that our Envoy is properly treated and enabled to bring his mission to a successful termination. That such may be his minor object is very likely. But there is strong reason to believe that his more important object or motive in sending an official with the Commissioner of the United States is to enable the Viceroy by this means to control and direct to a large degree the course of negotiations and nature of the treaty made.
In support of this view, I may say that I have been privately informed that the Viceroy has prepared a scheme of a treaty such as in his opinion Corea should conclude with the United States, and that this document is now in the hands of the Corean Government.
I have not been able to secure a copy of this very interesting paper, not to get more than a vague idea of its general features. It is said, however, to reflect with great accuracy the views of the Viceroy as to what would be a proper treaty between China and Foreign Power. Thus, it embodies Article II of the Commercial Treaty negotiated here in November, 1880, which prohibits traffic in opium; it stipulated that exterritorial jurisdiction by the United States over the people in Corea shall be temporary; makes several modifications in the articles on tonnage dues and duties as found in our treaties with this Empire, besides important changes in other directions.
It will thus be seen that should our Government undertake negotiations with Corea, and should Viceroy Li carry out his purpose to despatch a Chinese official to “assist” our Commissioner, the presence of such an individual might prove to be for more of a hindrance than a help in the transaction of the business. He would unquestionably have great influence with Corean Authorities and might indeed render the attempted negotiation an entire failure unless we consented to keep within the lines marked out in advance by the Viceroy.
There can be little doubt that the view taken by the Duke of Genoa, and Commodore Shufeldt, and communicated to the Department last year that the Japanese Government does not favor commercial intercourse between Corea and other Foreign Powers is substantially correct. If it be so, then our Commissioner would have both Chinese obstructiveness and Japanese intrigue to contend with in the transaction of his business. At the same time it is true that these two influences would counteract each other to a great degree. For the Chinese Government is constantly receiving bitter complaints from Corea of the overbearing and abusive conduct of Japanese officials and people towards Corean subjects, and is anxious on this account to bring some other Power besides Japan into relations with her neighbor.
On the whole I am of opinion that in case negotiations can be entered upon at all, they can, with patience, and persistence be brought to a successful termination, and secure to us a treaty which shall be reasonably satisfactory in itself and furnish a stepping stone to something better in the future.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant.
Chester Holcombe