Report of Commander H. C. Blake

UNITED STATES STEAMER ALASKA, (3d rate),
Boissée Island Anchorage, June 2, 1871

ADMIRAL:

　I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of the vessels placed under my command for the purpose of surveying the river Kang-Yan from this place as far up as the point directed by your verbal instructions. We weighed at 12 m., and proceeded up the river in the following order: Four steam-launches ahead, in line abreast, followed by the Palos, (on board of which vessel I was), the Monocacy bringing up the rear. I soon discovered that neither the Monocacy nor the Palos, having the tide with them, would go slow enough to allow the launches time for accurate angles or soundings. This part of the work will be of little value in constructing a chart of the river. We saw no indications of hostility on the part of the people until we reached the lower end of Kang Hoa Island, where commenced a line of forts, connected by a wall and facing the river. Here we observed came in view of the batteries, (called on the French charts Fort du Condé), we observed that they were manned, and the face of the hill occupied by lines of men, perhaps one thousand in number. From a parapet overlooking the forts and troops was flying a flag, the inscription on which, in Chinese characters, signified commanding general. On the point opposite was a line of small fortifications, likewise manned, and armed, I think, with no larger pieces of artillery than gingalls. In the main fort I could see but two or three large pieces of ordnance, perhaps 32-pounders, the remaining embrasures being occupied by five or six small pieces, lashed together. As we came up abreast the fortifications, a single shot, apparently from a pistol or musket, was fired from near the standard, and instantly from the forts and masked batteries along the face of the hill they opened a heavy fire upon the ships and boats, which was promptly returned from all the vessels, and which soon drove them from the guns, they retreating to the ravines. It was impossible to stop the vessels in the position they were when frist fired upon, they being at times nearly unmanageable, when going at full speed. I was compelled to pass the turn and anchor the vessels close under Fort Hydrographes, where I continued to fire upon the forts as long as we could see any indications of their being occupied.
　Shortly after anchoring, Commander McCrea came on board, and reported that his vessel, the Monocacy, had struck the rocks and was leaking badly. The officers having charge of the launches reported that they had expended all but a few rounds of ammunition. The port battery of the Palos soon became disabled from the slight construction of her bulwarks. We also found great difficulty in training the guns. To obviate this, I gave Lieutenant Commanding Rockwell permission to cut away so much of his rail and bulwark as was necessary.
　The launches having been filled with water from the vessels, we tripped our anchors and steamed back for the purpose of re-engaging the batteries. We passed them, but not a shot was fired at us, nor could we see any indication of their being occupied, except the flag spoken of wes still flying from the redoubt. In passing up. No response was made. Soon after we left our anchorage, in passing up, the Benicia’s steam-launch, in charge of Mr. Schroeder, became disabled by a lead-line fouling the propeller. As I was unable to stop at that point of the river, I was in hopes she would be able to rejoin me before I reached the fort. This she was unable to do, Mr. Schroeder very gallantly passing the fire from the sea-walls and hills without receiving any injury, and rejoining me after I had anchored beyond the forts.
　The casualties of the expedition were: John Somerdyke, ordinary seaman, gunshot wound in the left shoulder, and James Cochran, ordinary seaman, loss of two fingers by recoil of howitzer, both men belonging to the Alaska’s steam launch. None of the vessels or launches received any damage from the fire of the forts.
　It is with pleasure I bring to your notice the commendable manner in which both officers and men performed their duty on this occasion. The force under my command consisted of the Monocacy, Commander E. P. McCrea, United States Navy, with four 8-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles: The Palos, Lieutenant C. H. Rockwell, United States Navy, commanding; (on board of which vessel I was), with four 24-pounder howitzers, and two 24-pounder rifled howitzers; the Alaska’s steam-launch, with one light 12-pounder howitzer, and the following officers and crew with Remingtons: Lieutenant Commander C. M. Chester, United States Navy; in charge of launches; Lieutenant A. S. Snow, United States Navy; Master A. V. Wadhams, United States Navy; Frank Forrest, coxswain; Richard Maxwell, quartermaster; Henry Hawkshaw, quarter-gunner; George Brown, coxswain; John Campbell, captain foretop; William H. Legg, seaman; William Wills, seaman; George Jackson, ordinary seaman; James Cochran, ordinary seaman; Herman Farenholtz, ordinary seaman; John Somerdyke, ordinary seaman; Edward Cox, coppersmith; Thomas Smith, seaman, extra; Richard Hearn, landsman.
　The Benicia’s steam-launch with one 12-pounder rifled howitzer, with the following officers and crew armed with Remington rifles: Master Seaton Schroeder, United States Navy; Mate Samuel Gee, United States Navy; L. C, Staples, coxswain; John Hart, landsman; John Lawrence ordinary seaman; James Andrews, ordinary seaman; John Brady, 1st ordinary seaman; William Dougherty, landsman; Henry Garger, ordinary seaman; George Reese, ordinary seaman; William Roach, landsman.
　The Colorado’s steam-launch, with one light 12-pounder howitzer and the following officers and crew: Lieutenant W. W. Mead, United States Navy; Second Assistant Engineer H. L. Slosson, United States Navy; J. B. Boswell, acting mate and pilot; William Telfor, coxswain; Ira Smith, quarter gunner; James Hunter, seaman; Samuel Douglass, ordinary seaman; Adolph Michler, seaman, extra; H. W. Ingleson, quartermaster; George Carveth, seaman; William Jackson, seaman; John Fletcher, landsman; Austin Grogan, ordinary seaman, extra.
　The Colorado’s steam cutter, with one light 12-pounder howitzer and the following officers and crew: Lieutenant George M. Totten, United States Navy; Assistant Paymaster R. P. Paulding, United States Navy, of the United States steamer Palos; Othniel Tripp, coxswain; Jamse M. Taylor, quarter-gunner; James Sullivan, ordinary seaman; John Mehau, ordinary seaman; Michael Lehan, landsman, extra; Frederick Franklin, quartermaster; John Scrite, ordinary seaman; Thomas Allen, ordinary seaman; William H. Smith, seaman, extra.
　The absence of the Benicia’s steam-launch is explained in the body of my report.
　Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HOMER C. BLAKE,
Commander, United States Navy

Rear-Admiral JOHN RODGERS, U. S. N.,
　Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet

Report of Rear-Admiral John Rodgers

FLAG-SHIP OF ASIATIC FLEET,
Chefoo, China, July 5, 1871

Sir:
　In a telegraphic message, under date of June 3, and again in my dispatch No. 38 of the same date, I had the honor to advise the department of the events attending the expedition to Corea, conveying His Excellency Mr. Low, United States Minister to China, for purpose of negotiating a treaty in accordance with the instructions received from the Government. In the dispatches referred to, I informed the Department of the unprovoked and treacherous assaults made on the 1st of June, by the forts on Kang-Hoa Island, upon a portion of the squadron engaged in an examination of Salée River, and of my intention to resent the insult offered to our flag, should no sufficient apology or satisfactory explanation be offered for the hostile action of the Corean government.
　Again, under date of June 23, I sent a telegraphic dispatch, announcing the result of the retaliatory action which we were compelled to take in vindication of the honor of the flag.
　I have now the honor to write more at length concerning these matters. From the time of the attack of June 1, upon our vessels, ten days were allowed to pass before any movement was made. During this time no apology was offered, nor was an accredited officer sent to confer with Mr. Low. Indeed, in correspondence which passed between the minister and the prefect of the district lying hereabout, the ambushed attempt to cut off and destroy our whole surveying party was assumed by the Corean official to be entirely in accordance with the proprieties of intercourse between civilized people, their own civilization being, as was somewhat proudly stated, four thousand years old. Under these circumstances, nothing remained but to fulfill, with Mr. Low’s full approbation and concurrence, the expectations which the Corean authorities might reasonably entertain from the words which the minister had addressed to them, to the effect that, in case due amends were not offered to the Minister and Admiral, they would know how to obtain satisfaction for the wanton attempt to destroy their surveying party.
　I may here remark that the delay of ten days had, apart from the propriety of giving the Coreans an opportunity to reconsider the hostile attitude which they had assumed, been expiration of that time, when the neap tides would render navigation in the little known and difficult passages of the Salée River less perilous than it was during the prevalence of the spring tides. Even with the more moderate neap tides our vessels did not escape injury, as will be hereafter seen.
　All preparations for our movement being completed, at 10 o’clock a.m., on the 10th of June, the expedition started. In pursuance of the humane policy indicated in the letters of instructions from the State and Navy Departments to Mr. Low and myself, it was decided that the punishment to be inflicted upon the Coreans should be confined to the forts from which the offense had been given. Copies of my orders to Commander H. C. Blake and to Commander L. A. Kimberly, marked respectively A and B, are herewith transmitted. The force dispatched consisted of the Monocacy, Commander E. P. McCrea; Palos, Lieutenant C. H. Rockwell, and four steam-launches, in charge of Lieutenant Commander H. F. Picking, conveying the boats of the squadron, in which were embarked all the men available for a landing force. The Monocacy received the additional armament of two 9-inch guns, transferred from the Colorado. The force detailed from the Colorado, Alaska, and Benicia, numbered seven hundred and fifty-nine men. Of these, the crews of he steam-launches and the boat-keepers numbered one hundred and eighteen men, leaving the actual force put on shore six hundred and fifty-one men. Of these, one hundred and five were marines. Seven howitzers were landed. Commander H. C. Blake, of the Alaska, commanded in chief. He was to remain afloat, and went on board the Palos, Commander L. A. Kimberly of the Benicia, was detailed, at his own request, to command the landing force. Lieutenant Commander Silas Casey commanded the infantry battalion, with Lieutenant Commander W. K. Wheeler, second in command. Lieutenant Commander D. R. Cassel commanded the artillery. Captain McLane Tilton commanded the marines. Accompanying this dispatch I transmit a chart, upon which the positions and movements of the two days’ operations are given.
　The expedition moved with the Monocacy, preceded by two steam-launches surveying the channel in advance, while the Palos, having in tow twenty-two boats with the landing force, followed. The Monocacy had the duty of shelling the enemy’s first fort, and of clearing away opposition to the landing. This first fort, now designated on the chart “marine redoubt,” is distant about _____ (Sic) miles from the anchorage at Isle Boissée. As soon as the Monocacy came within good range, she opened upon the enemy’s works with shell. The enemy returned the fire for a time, but was soon driven out, and when our landing was made abandoned the position and fled. The Palos coming up the boats pulled in for the shore, and effected a landing below the fort. The point chosen for the disembarkation, while seemingly as good as any in other respects, was, for military reasons, deemed the best, since it flanked the enemy’s works, and left nothing to be feared in our rear.
　The character of the shore was unknown, and it proved to be most unfavorable for our purpose. Between the water and the firm land a broad belt of soft mud, traversed by deep gullies, had to be passed. The men, stepping from the boats, sank to the knees, and so tenacious was the clay, that in many cases they lost gaiters and shoes, and even trowsers’ legs. The guns sank above the axles of their carriages, and it required the strenuous exertions of many men to get them through.
　The landing was covered by the guns of the Palos and the steam-launches. The boats reached the shore at about noon. As soon as firm ground was attained, the infantry battalion was formed, and the marines deployed as skirmishers. The advance at once began, and the first fort was quietly occupied. This fort was constructed of stone, its walls being about 12 feet high. From the upper flank stretched a long water battery; it mounted thirty odd guns of various caliber, most of them being the small bronze breach-loading pieces of from one to two inch bore; five or six were about 18-pounders, and there were two 32-pounders.
　The destruction of the fort was at once begun. The guns were cast into the river, with the exception of the 32-pounders, which were spiked. The walls of the fort were thrown down, and the stores of powder, provisions, and clothing burned. By this time the afternoon was so far gone that it was not expedient to make a further advance on that day. The force, therefore, went into camp upon a favorable spot in the vicinity of the fort.
　The marines, with one howitzer, occupied the position in advance of the main body of the force, and pickets were established to guard against surprise during the night. The Coreans made an attack at about midnight, but it was confined to distant firing upon our lines, and a few shells thrown by the howitzers caused their retreat. On the morning of the 11th, the destruction of the first fort was made more complete, and the advance began, at an early hour, toward the main objects of attack, the enemy’s forts on the point at the turn of the river, about three miles above. The next defense of the enemy was a stone fort built upon a bluff, about a mile distant from that already occupied. It is now designated on the chart Fort Monocacy. This fort also had been shelled by the “Monocacy” and being reconnoitred by the Marines was found to be entirely deserted.
　It was a square structure and occupied a strong position: it mounted about the same number of guns, similar in character to those destroyed in the first fort. This place also was dismantled without delay.
　The force again moved on. The march was a most difficult one. The country is a succession of steep hills, with deep ravines between, over which foot soldiers passed with great fatigue: while the [guns men] got on only by widening the paths, when there were paths, and by cutting out the bushes and filling up gullies in other places; they were dragged up steep activities by whole companies detailed to help the artilleries, or lowered down from the heights with ropes.
　A squad of sappers and miners, provided with shovels, picks and axes, was very useful in facilitating the passage of the artillery, as well as in destroying the fortifications.
　As the advance continued toward the upper and main fort, large bodies of the Coreans were seen on the left flank of our force, and in such position that, when the direction of our march was changed, as it must be to approach the forts, they would be behind us and have us cut off from retreat should we be repulsed in the assault upon the forts in front.
　To guard against danger of an attack upon our rear while engaged in front, five (5) howitzers with three companies of infantry, under the command of Lieut Comdr Wheeler, were placed in strong position which they held as a [sea] guard during the advance of the main body.
　Their service was most valuable inasmuch as they checked several attempts of the enemy to advance and, by their accurate fire, prevented a very large body from ever getting fairly into action. They also did good service by their fire, directed over our forces, against the forts beyond.
　At about eleven o’clock on the forenoon of the 11th of June, the hill nearest to the enemy’s stronghold, or citadel, was gained.
　The Monocacy having moved up the river, keeping nearly abreast our land force, had taken position and shelled the forts for some time before our men came up to their vicinity.
　This fire was continued until our assaulting force was ready, when signal being made, it was discontinued.
　Behind the crest of the hill which they occupied our men were formed for the assault upon the citadel, now distant about one hundred and fifty yards, and, covered from the enemy’s fire, they rested awhile to recover from the exhaustion of this hurried march under a hot sun. Up to this time although there had been some brisk skirmishing [but] few of our men had been wounded: several had been prostrated by sunstroke. The citadel about to be assaulted the key to the defenses upon the point below, was built upon the apex of a conical hill about one hundred and fifty feet high, from the bottom of the ravine through which our men had to pass to reach it.
　The hillside was very steep and the walls of the fort joined the acclivity with scarcely a break in the line.
　Had not the face of the walls been somewhat shattered by the shells from Monocacy and the howitzers on shore, the escalade would have been most difficult.
　Our men kept up a fire from their resting place, upon the fort, whenever an enemy [exposed] himself, and this they did constantly and with the most reckless courage for they maintained an incessant fire, mounting the wall and discharging [there] as fast as they could load. There was no artillery in the citadel.
　When all was ready the order to charge was given by Lieut Comdr Casey, and our men rushed forward, down the slope and up the opposite hill. The enemy maintained their fire with the utmost rapidity until our men got quite up the hill, then having no time to load they mounted the parapet and cast stones upon our men below, fighting with the greatest [fury]. Nothing could check our men on they rushed. The heroic McKee was first to mount the parapet, and the first to leap into a hand to hand conflict. There he fell, as his father feel in Mexico, at the head of his men, [the] first inside the enemy’s stormed works. Other officers and men were quickly over the parapet. The fighting inside the fort was desperate. The resolution of the Coreans was unyielding. They apparently expected no quarter and probably would have given no quarter, and probably would have given none. They fought to the death and only when the last man fell did the conflict cease.
　The enemy made no organized resistance in the forts lower down on the point toward the river. These were opened to a rear attack by the capture of the citadel and the garrison fled, many of them however feel under the fire of our musketry and howitzers which hand nearly cut them off from retreat.
　One killed were Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee. Seth A. Allen, Landsman of the Colorado, who was shot as he scaled the parapet, and [B- H- ], Private Marine of the Benicia who was shot on the opposite hill just before the assault was made. These three comprise the list of the honored dead. Few men were wounded they are all now out of danger. The Surgeon’s report of casualties is herewith transmitted.
　Of the enemy two hundred and forty three (243) dead were counted in the citadel and the forts. The Citadel has been named “Fort McKee” in memory of the gallant officer who led the assault upon it and gave his life for the honor of his Flag.
　To return to the vessels engaged: after the boats left the Palos and had mad their landing that vessel got underway to pass up to join the Monocacy in the attack upon the forts. Unfortunately she struck a rock in mid-channel, not set down on the charts, and remained fast with the falling tide. She heeled over and had a hole stove in her bottom from which she leaked badly. It was only with the rising tide that she got off and anchored late in the evening. It required the full employment of [free] steam pumps to keep her afloat.
　The Monocacy dragged her anchors in the night and was brought up only with an additional anchor after she had drifted for a considerable distance. In swinging with the tide she, also, struck and grated upon sunken rocks but receive no serious injury so far as is know.
　Two of the steam launches were stove and one of them had to be put on shore to receive temporary repairs. These circumstances well serve to indicate the extreme difficulties and hazards which our force afloat encountered. Even with the advantage of the weak tides, comparatively moderate in their force, and with all the care and precaution which could be taken, four (4) of the six (6) steamers engaged, large and small suffered injury.
　In the affair of June 1st, as mentioned in a former despatch, the Monocacy received an injury, by striking the rocks, from which she leaked so badly that it was thought for a time that it would be necessary to run her ashore to keep her from sinking.
　Both the Monocacy and Palos received repairs of a temporary character, by which the leaks were overcome. It will be necessary to dock both vessels and they have been sent to Shanghai for that purpose.
　To summarize the results of the operations of the 10th and 11th of June: We captured and destroyed five forts, those on “Point du Coudé” being probably amongst the principal and strongest in the Kingdom. Fifty flags were taken indicating that of the Generalissimo; four hundred and eighty-one (481) pieces of ordnance fell into our hand, besides very many matchlocks and gin-gals. The guns comprised: Eleven (11) thirty-two pounders, Fourteen (14) twenty-four (24) pounders, Two (2) twenty (20) pounders, and the remainder, four hundred and fifty-four, (454) were two (2) and four (4) pounders.
　Two hundred and forty-three dead Coreans were counted in the works. Few prisoners were taken, not above twenty, and some of these were wounded. These last were treated with all the attention possible, and finally released. Thus was a treacherous attack upon our people and an insult to our flag redressed.
　On the afternoon of the capture of the “du Condé” forts, Commander Blake sent down to me a dispatch announcing the victory and requesting instructions, stating at the same time that the position gained on shore could be held. It was not deemed desirable to do this, inasmuch as our purpose was not to enter upon extended operations, and on account of the exceeding danger and difficulty of holding the vessels in position in the furious and uncertain currents of the river, he was directed to withdraw the entire force on the following morning, the 12th June. This was effected without hinderance or accident, and the vessels, with the landing force embarked, returned to the Boisée anchorage. It gives me the greatest satisfaction to say that in this expedition our officers and men encountered difficulties which were surmounted only by the most arduous labor, and defeated a determined enemy in a desperate fight with a patience and courage most admirable. A victory was won of which the Navy may well feel proud. It now remains with the Government to determine what further steps, if any, shall be taken toward requiring from Corea those engagements which it was our purpose in visiting the coast to obtain if we might.
　Herewith are transmitted copies of my orders to Commanders H. C. Blake and L. A. Kimberly, and the reports of those officer; also, the reports of Commander E. P. McCrea, and of Lieutenant Commander W. S. Schley, Silas Casey, D. P. Cassel, W. K. Wheeler, and of Captain McLane Tilton, United States Marine Corps, together with the surgeon’s list of casualties. Also, I transmit a copy of my General Order No. 32. The fleet sailed from the anchorage off Isle Boisée, on the morning of 3d July, and arrived in the harbor of Chefoo on the morning of the 5th.
　I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS,
Rear-Admiral, commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet

Hon. GEO. M. ROBESON,
　Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COLORADO, (1st rate),
FLAG-SHIP OF THE ASIATIC FLEET,
Isle Boisée Anchorage, Corea, June 9, 1871

Sir:
　The attack to be made upon the Corean forts on the Salée River, which recently treacherously fired on our surveying party, is committed to you.
　The attacking force, will consist of the Monocacy, Palos, the four armed steam-launches, and the armed launches and boats of the fleet; the latter conveying the landing force detailed from the ships, under the immediate command of Commander L. A. Kimberly.
　The vessels are to approach the point selected for anchorage, shelling the forts and driving out the soldiers occupying them, before the boats are permitted to leave the ships to make the landing.
　When the enemy shall have been driven out of their works the force under Commander Kimberly will effect a landing, the armed launches supporting and covering the debarkation.
　The most serious difficulties which I apprehend he in the natural obstacles of rocks, shoal water, and furious currents; and if it should be found impossible to hold the vessel in the position necessary to secure the boats and to cover the force on shore, you will embark the landing party at your discretion.
　The object sought in this expedition being simply to take and destroy the forts which have fired on our vessels, and to hold them long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at pleasure, it is my present purpose to withdraw the whole force after a period of about twenty-two hours has elapsed, or at the last of the flood tide of the day following the capture.
　Should you decide that the position gained may be held indefinitely long, or that there is a prospect of any material advantage in doing so, you will then, by steam-launch, communicate with me.
　The only object sought by the expedition to this country is to make such a treaty as the minister has been instructed by the Government to secure, if he may, and you will, therefore, take advantage of any overtures which may be made toward peace, if they shall seem to you to offer a reasonable opportunity of attaining the ends which the Government has in view, or to afford a cover for the withdrawal of your force, should that be desirable, referring, of course, the matter of terms to be granted to the minister and myself.
　All that I have here written has been amply discussed; but, should incidents arise giving an unexpected complexion to the aspect of affaire, you must use your discretion.
　Anything you shall decide upon will, I am sure, meet deserved approval.
　Wishing you and your command success and a safe return,
　I am, very respectfully,

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet

Commander H. C. BLAKE, U. S. N.,
　Commanding United States Steamer Alaska

UNITED STATES STEAMER ALASKA, (3d rate),
Isle Boisée, June 17, 1871

ADMIRAL:
　I respectfully submit the following detailed report of the movements and operations of the forces placed under my command by your order of the 9th instant, to operate on the Corean forts on the river Salée, which recently treacherously fired upon our surveying party. The force consisted of the Monocacy, Commander E. P. McCrea, United States Navy; the Palos, Lieutenant Rockwell, United States Navy, commanding, four steam-launches, under command of Lieutenant Commander H. F. Picking, United States Navy; together with five hundred and eight men, rank and file, from the various ships, in their respective boats, under the immediate command of Commander L. A. Kimberly, United States Navy, of the Benicia.
　At 10 a. m. of the 10th instant, the Monocacy was directed to weigh, and accompanied by two steam-launches, to proceed up the river and commence the attack upon the forts, to clear the way for the landing party. At 10.30 a. m., all the boats having taken their proper places for towing, (two steam-launches having been detailed to keep in our rear, in case of accident,) the Palos weighed and proceeded up the river with the boats in tow. A short distance above the Isle Primauguet observed a Corean junk coming toward us, waving a white flag. Sent one of the steam-launches and took from them a communications from a high official, addressed to you. In accordance with your verbal instructions I opened the letter, which was translated to me by Mr. Drew, secretary of legation, who accompanied the expedition as interpreter. As it contained no apology for the insult offered, or overture of a friendly settlement of the difficulty, we proceeded up the river, and at 1 p. m. came in sight of the lower forts, now known as Marine Redoubt, and found the Monocacy and steam launches engaged with them. At 1.30 reached a point just below Marine Redoubt, when Lieutenant Commander Picking came alongside and informed me that, as far as he was able to judge, a good landing could be effected at that place. I was induced to change the location of landing from the unexpected resistance of the Coreans at these forts and the state of the tide. Subsequent events, I think, proved the correctness of this proceeding. At 1.35 anchored the Palos, and at 1.43 the landing party left for the beach, in formation as directed by General Order of June 5, approved by you, and reached the shore at 1.45.
　From the moment the command struck the beach until the brilliant termination of the expedition, a contest waged, with natural and artificial defenses opposed to us which, at times, appeared almost insurmountable; but, thanks to the gallantry and untiring energy of both officers and men, they were finally overcome.
　As soon as the landing party and artillery were well started for the beach, the Palos weighed and attempted to pass through the narrows for the purpose of bringing her light guns into action on the forts. Unfortunately she struck upon a rock in the middle of the channel (not on the chart) and did not float until 9 p. m., then leaking badly. She was anchored below the narrows, where she remained until our return to the fleet. I regret exceedingly this accident, and other circumstances, which deprived her commander, officers, and crew of the opportunity of taking a more active part in the attack on the forts, knowing well that the desire and ability was there to do good service.
　As soon as I found that the Palos would remain on the rocks for some time, I detailed the Benicia’s steam-launch to attend upon her, to carry out anchors, &c., and went in the Alaska’s launch to the Monocacy. Found that she had dragged from her first anchorage, close to the narrows. Directed commander McCrea, as soon as it was advisable, to get his anchor and take the position below the main fort, now called Fort McKee, recommended by you. All the positions taken by the Monocacy were well selected for the work in hand, and she did it well. The accuracy of her fire I have never seen excelled. The artillery, after reaching the beach, could not be placed upon hard ground until 4 p. m., when Commander Kimberly very judiciously decided to encamp for the night where he was, to rest his men.
　June 11, at 5.30 a. m., Commander Kimberly signaled for instructions. The answer given was, “Go ahead and take the forts.” He immediately started on his march up the river, toward the second or stone fort, since named Fort Monocacy by you, being nearly all the time under fire from the adjacent hill-tops, notwithstanding which he reached and carried the fort about 7.15 a. m. From this point the command gallantly pushed forward to the final charge and capture of the citadel, now called Fort McKee. This charge was as gallant a deed as the Navy ever performed. I am sorry to say that it cost us Lieutenant McKee and two men killed, three severely and five slightly wounded.
　At 1 p. m. dispatched my clerk, who was acting as aid, to the fleet, to announce our brilliant victory. At 8 p. m. Mr. Farrington returned, bringing your letter, which was immediately forwarded to Commanders Kimberly and McCrea for their guidance. The steam-launches, under charge of Lieutenant Commander Picking, were invaluable. They did good service with their guns whenever an opportunity occurred. Chief Engineer Henderson, of the Colorado, who went with the expedition as a volunteer, with his usual energy, always appeared at the right time, either to take a message or to aid me with his professional abilities.
　At the request of Commander Kimberly, the boats were sent up under Fort McKee, where he embarked his command aboard the Monocacy, about 7 a. m. on the morning of the 12th, when the expedition returned to the fleet, having successfully accomplished the duty assigned to it.
　I herewith transmit Commander Kimberly’s report and accompanying papers. It is so full and complete that leaves me nothing to add, excepting that I heartily approve of all that he has said respecting the gallantry displayed by both officers and men under his command and that you could not have selected a more gallant and competent officer for the duty. I beg to call your attention to that part of his report in which he speaks of the organization and drill of the men, as it tells louder than words of the efficiency of your fleet.
　I also inclose report of Commander E. P. McCrea, commanding Monocacy, and Lieutenant Rockwell, commanding the Palos.
　I feel it my duty to bring to your notice the heroism of Lieutenant McKee; his actions, witnessed by all the command, need no comments from me.
　Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HOMER C. BLAKE,
Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding Expedition
against the Corean Forts on the River Salée.

Rear-Admiral JOHN RODGERS, U. S. N.,
　Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet

UNITED STATES STEAMER COLORADO, (1st rate),
FLAG-SHIP OF THE ASIATIC FLEET,
Boisée Anchorage, off Salée River, Corea, June 9, 1871

Sir:
　The general command of the attack to be made upon the Corean forts on the Salée River is intrusted to Commander H. C. Blake, while the force detailed from the ships of the fleet for a landing party is placed under your immediate command.
　In my instructions to Commander Blake, I have directed him to approach the point selected for the anchorage of the vessels engaged in the expedition, shelling the forts and driving out the soldiers in them before the boats are permitted to leave the ships to make the landing.
　When the enemy shall have been driven out of their works, the force under your command will effect a landing, the armed launches supporting and covering the debarkation. The most careful precautions will be taken to secure the boats, so that they may be available at any moment to re-embark your command.
　The most serious difficulties, I apprehend, lie in the natural obstacles of rocks, shoal-water, and violent currents, which may render it impossible for Commander Blake to hold his vessels in position to secure the boats and cover your force on shore. Should such be the case, Commander Blake is instructed to re-embark the landing party at his discretion.
　While on shore, you will use every means in your power to guard against surprise or ambuscade, as such are said to be the favorite mode of warfare with the Coreans; and you will not pursue any advantage you may gain so far as to risk losing that already obtained.
　After taking the forts you will destroy the works and armaments, by breaking the guns and by such other means as may seem to you to be practicable, reserving and bringing away with you such war trophies as can be carried without inconvenience.
　The object sought in this expedition being only to take and destroy the forts which have so treacherously attacked our vessels and to hold the position long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at pleasure, it is my present purpose to withdraw the whole force engaged after a period of about twenty-two hours, or at the last of the flood-tide of the next day after the taking of the position.
　Should it be decided that the position may be held indefinitely long, and that there is a prospect of material advantage in doing so, Commander Blake is directed to communicate with me by steam-launch.
　Commander Blake is further instructed to take advantage of any overtures which may be the enemy toward peace, if they shall seem to offer a reasonable opportunity of attaining the end for which the Government has sent the expedition to this country, namely, the treaty which the minister is instructed to secure, if he may, or if such overtures afford a cover for the withdrawal of his force, should that be desirable.
　Trusting that you and your force will succeed and return in safety,
　I am, very respectfully,

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Fleet.

Commander L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. N.,
　Commanding United States Steamer Benicia

UNITED STATES STEAMER MONOCACY, (4th rate),
Boisée Island Achorage, June 14, 1871

Sir:
　I respectfully submit the following report, in relation to the engagement with the Corean forts, up the river Salée, on the 10th and 11the instant, by this vessel under my command. At 10.30 a. m. on the 10th instant, in conformity with your order, got under way and steamed up the river in the following order, got under way and steamed up the river in the following order: Steam-launch Weehawken, (Lieutenant Commander Picking), ahead sounding, followed by this vessel and the three steam-launches; lastly the Palos, (Commander H. C. Blake in charge), towing the boats, nineteen in number, which accompanied the expedition, and carried the landing party.
　The tide was running flood at the time and near high water, so we steamed up slowly, running under one-bell speed. At 11.30 a. m., as we came up with the battery on the south end of Louise Island, we threw into it a few shells, but received no reply, as the battery was deserted. Passing Louise Island, we threw three of four shells into a stone-work, (in front of a village on the island), partially demolishing it.
　Keeping on up the river, as we came within about eight hundred yards of the first fort, we opened fire upon it. As we closed up with the first fort, being obliged to pass within three hundred yards, the enemy opened fire at us from first and second forts, which fire we briskly returned; many of the enemy’s shots passing over our decks, doing but little damage, simply cutting the standing rigging in a few places and lodging in the hammock-nettings. We came to an anchor above the forts, they bearing south-southwest five hundred and fifty yards; keeping up a brisk fire, we soon silenced them, demolishing all the north and east faces of second fort. The forts being silenced, the boats which contained the landing party pushed for the shore, effecting a landing, without opposition, about eight hundred yards below first fort, on a mud-flat. The skirmishers immediately advanced toward first fort, when, by signal from Palos, we ceased tiring upon first and second forts; soon afterward our skirmishers entered and took possession. We now turned our attention to the third fort, which we commenced shelling at a distance of nine hundred yards. Again getting under way, we took up a position within five hundred yards of third fort, and concentrated our fire upon the northeast corner of it, where a heavy gun appeared to be in position. While taking up the above position the fort opened a heavy fire upon us. After silencing it we occasionally threw a shell into it and into the woods in front of our advanced force. By this time darkness had set in, and we lay quietly at anchor for the night. During the night the strong ebb-tide caused the ship to drag, when we let go a second anchor, which brought her up. At daylight of the 11th signal was made from the second fort that the land forces were about to advance, upon which we got under way and steamed up until third fort bore west-southwest five hundred yards, when we anchored and commenced firing upon bodies of the enemy seen in front of our advance force, and throwing shells into the citadel, Fort du Condé, and the earth-works upon Point Sun-tol-mok, causing much running among the several garrisons. Early in the morning our land forces took possession of third fort and demolished the parapet-wall, throwing over the cliff all the guns. Upon the floo-tide making (at 7 a. m.) we again weighed anchor and dropped up to a position one thousand two hundred yards south by west one half west of the citadel. While taking up our new position the earth-works upon Point Sun-tol-mok opened a brisk fire upon us. Most of their shots fell short, a few striking our sides and falling back into the water without doing any damage. This fire we promptly returned, causing the enemy soon to seek refuge in their bomb-proofs. At 10 a. m. signal was made from the shore to fire upon the citadel. We commenced bombarding it, firing 15-second shell from the after 9-inch gun, until 11 a. m., when signal was made from the shore to cease firing. At this time our land forces had begun to assemble upon the hill-top, about five hundred yards to the west of citadel, and were about to storm it. At 11.15 a. m. the assault was made, and at 11.20 a. m. our flag was flying on the east parapet of the citadel. We gave three cheers for the storming party. Just at that moment the works upon Point Sun-tol-mok again opened fire upon us. As this was the last fort to silence, and from its position dangerous to our forces on the opposite shore, I gave my whole attention to this point, and by a rapid and heavy fire of shell and shrapnel, at last not only made the enemy leave their guns, but to retreat over the hills.
　Signal was now made from shore to “send boats for wounded,” which was done. Soon after Lieutenant H. W. McKee was brought aboard mortally wounded, and Private Dennis Hanrahan, (Benicia Marine Corps), and Seth Allen, (ordinary seaman, Benicia), dead. Soon after other boats came, bringing the slightly wounded, prisoners, many battel-flags, &c. At 5.45 p. m. Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee died.
　At 7 p. m. weighed anchor and dropped up with the flood-tide two hundred yards nearer the citadel. About 8 p. m. our forces at the citadel opened fire upon Point Sun-tol-mok, whereupon we also opened fire, and ceased at discretion. About 10 p. m. a communication was received from Commander Blake, to be forwarded to Commander Kimberly, which was promptly done. Throughout the night things remained quiet.
　Having given orders for all the boats to be alongside this vessel at 4 a. m., 12th instant, the steam launches employed themselves in bringing up the boats from early daylight, (3 a. m.) Commander Kimberly desired to embark the land forces at slack low-water.
　We had all the boats on shore at the time of low-water, (6.15 a. m.,) and by 7.30 a. m. all the land forces were embarked, the great majority coming aboard this vessel, as the Palos was, from circumstances, too far distant, and would have caused delay. As soon as the flood-tide had made we up anchor and proceeded down the river, towing most of the boats. Passed the Palos at anchor below first fort. At 10.30 a. m. came to anchor abreast the Colorado, and after the landing party had returned to their respective ships we sent our wounded to their respective vessels, and the prisoners to the Colorado, retaining five wounded prisoners aboard this vessel, one of whom died during the night. I cannot speak too highly of the officers and men who, for forty-eight hours, never left their quarters. Five men were carried from their quarters from sunstroke. I inclose you the surgeon’s report of killed and wounded.
　I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

E. P. McCREA,
Commnader

Commander H. C. BLAKE,
　Commanding Expedition against the Corean Forts, Salée River.

N. B. - Forts first and second are now known as Marine Redoubt, fort third as Fort Monocacy, and Sun-tol-mok as For Palos, and the citadel as Fort McKee.

UNITED STATES STEAMER BENICIA, (3rd rate),
Boisée Anchorage, June 15, 1871

Sir:
　I have to make the following report of the operations of the land force organized for the purpose of destroying the forts that fired upon our steam-launches and vessels that were sent some time ago up the river.
　The force was embarked in twenty-two boats, towed by the Palos, on the morning of the 10th instant at 10 a. m., and landed at the first fort on the river on an extensive mud-flat at meridian 30. The troops were formed with the marines in advance as skirmishers, and proceeded as rapidly as possible, but slowly indeed, owing to the nature of the ground. The enemy that remained in the fort after its shelling by the Monocacy fled upon the approach of our troops in their rear. The marines were the first to enter this fort, closely followed by the blur jackets.
　The artillery, consisting of seven pieces, under command of Lieutenant Commander Cassel, was landed with great difficulty from the boats, owing to the softness and depth of the mud, in which they sank up to their axle-trees, and required a force of from seventy-five to eighty men to drag them to firm ground, which at least was from one-quarter to one-half of a mile distant; the men sinking up to their thighs, losing shoes, socks, leggings, and in some instances a part of their pants, in this soft but tenacious clay. What rendered the landing still more difficult was, that this point was intersected by numerous gullies, from 5 to 8 feet deep and of various widths, caused by the constant washing of the receding tides. These gullies were not perceptible until one stood upon their brink, for the flat appeared a continuous level plain.
　The reason for landing here was that by so doing the fort was flanked, and did away with the necessity of exposing the men in open boats to the fire of the guns of the fort.
　The Monocacy did good service at this fort in breaching the walls in several places and in driving a considerable force from the fort; but quite a number of Coreans still remained protected by their bomb-proofs until our troops landed in their rear.
　The first redoubt was in the shape of an ellipse, mounting fifty-four guns, two being 32-pounders, the others breech-loaders of one inch to one inch and a half caliber; in the rear of the main fort was a plateau about one mile in circuit, a little elevated, and surrounded on two sides by paddy-fields, on its third side by the low mud-flat, covered at high tide, and on the river-side by the fort itself. On this plateau we encamped the first evening, owing to the lateness of the hour, when our field-pieces were all drawn up to the camp, it being about 4.30 p. m., too late to destroy the fort and to march to the next.
　After posting pickets, commenced breaking the walls, guns &c., and the next morning before marching burned all the houses used by the Coreans for military purposes. At 5.30 a. m. on the 11th instant, marched out with the whole force, the marines in advance, the sappers and miners clearing the road for the artillery, Mr. Quinn in charge of them.
　The third fort was taken by the marines without resistance, and they threw overboard the guns, viz, thirty-three breech-loaders and four 32-pounders, (vide Captain Tilton’s report). One main body in the mean time marched to the top of a high hill ahead of us, and on reaching its summit observed the Coreans in considerable force on a very high and fortified ridge out of long rifle range; finding our rifled howitzers unable to reach, and the paths appearing to lead away too far from the river, we retraced our steps and got upon a ridge nearer and parallel to the river, and proceeded on toward the last fort, which was the main object of the expedition. While forming for this object Mr. Pillsbury was sent with his company to the fourth fort or battery, where he dismounted and threw into the river a number of guns, (see his report,) and then rejoined the main column. The marines were also withdrawn from this fort and thrown ahead of the column as skirmishers, and after marching a short distance became engaged with the enemy on the high ridge on our left before alluded to. As the skirmish line became rather briskly engaged, several pieces of artillery were sent with great exertion to the top of a high hill, which gave us for the time a strong and good position for holding the enemy in check; observing still another hill on our right which commanded the road we wished to travel, a position was taken on it to protect the rear of our advancing force.
　Leaving Lieutenant Commanders Wheeler and Heyerman, with five pieces of artillery and two companies of infantry, (one commanded by Heyerman, the other by Master Drake), the main column now passed out toward the fort, the importance of its speedy capture being caused by the great and increasing numbers of the Coreans that were collecting rapidly in our rear and left flank. After a rapid and exhausting march up and down high and steep hills, and being now on the last ridge near the foot, a rapid and vigorous charge was made under a heavy fire from the Coreans, and the redoubt or citadel was carried by assault.
　The enemy leaving a large number of dead and wounded on the field, the remainder scattered and fled, many of whom were cut off by Master McLean, Company G, and Master Schroeder with the artillery, (two pieces light 12-pounders,) who intercepted their retreat, and did good service in demoralizing the fleeing Coreans.
　The citadel was captured, but dearly so, as the gallant and brave McKee, the first to enter over the parapet, fell mortally wounded with two wounds; he has since died, and the Navy has lost one of her bravest and noblest sons. Lieutenant Commander Schley was the next officer in the fort, and killed the Corean who wounded McKee. Lieutenant Commander Casey, Lieutenants Totten, McIlvaine, Master Brown, Lieutenant Breese, United States Marine Corps, Captain Tilton, United States Marine Corps, and several others, with marines and sailors, filled the citadel and drove the enemy, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight, over the walls. To Hugh Pervis, private marine United States steamer Alaska, belongs the honor of hauling down the Corean standard on the redoubt. (See Captain Tilton’s report)
　The sailors and marines who were first in the fort and close to their officers are mentioned in the reports of their immediate commanding officers. The first man killed on our side in the assault near the redoubt was Seth Allen, a landsman on board the Colorado, who was ahead of all others in the charge. The whole affair was splendidly executed by officers and men, and all did their whole duty nobly and well. Forty-seven standards were captured and one hundred and eighty-two cannon.
　The fort is a very strong one, and could be rendered impregnable with a little labor. The guns were spiked and thrown into the river, and the walls of the several batteries were thrown down, after which the force was distributed to hold our position until the next morning.
　The object of our expedition having been accomplished, the force was embarked in the boats of the fleet and the men landed of board of the Monocacy, which soon got under way and proceeded down the river, followed by the Palos, to this anchorage.
　Although not immediately connected with the operations of the vessels and boats after landing, facts bear out the statement that the greatest assistance was rendered to us by the Monocacy in sending us ammunition, provisions, receiving our wounded, and by the accuracy of her firing, which held the enemy in check, and left the land force free to act to the best advantage; she kept the whole river-front clear of the enemy; and it is my firm belief that her presence during our last night on shore prevented us, in a great measure, from being annoyed by the enemy. I feel grateful to Commander McCrea for his prompt, valuable, and kind assistance at all times.
　To Lieutenant Commander Picking, who had charge of the steam-launches and boats, we are under great obligations for the manner in which he was at all times near us to assist with his guns and boats, and it was to his exertions in getting the boats up that our very successful embarkation from the upper forts took place, and which was really a serious matter, taking everything into consideration.
　In the organization of this expedition, the sappers and miners proved to be a most valuable body of men; without them we could not have succeeded, as it was by their laborious and faithful assistance we managed to get our artillery along. They widened the foot-paths, tore down the walls of batteries, and destroyed guns, and the first night on shore performed picket duty. Mr. Henderson, fleet engineer, voluntarily rendered the greatest assistance with this corps.
　The country the force passed through is admirably adapted for guerrilla warfare, being filled with high and steep hills, and intersected with deep and crooked ravines, covered in many cases with underbrush. The handling of the artillery was a labor almost inconceivable, and it is a wonder that we managed to get the pieces along at all; the credit of this is due to Lieutenant Commander Cassel and his able assistants, Lieutenants Mead, Snow, and Masters Schroeder and Wadhams. At times it required a whole company of infantry to assist the regular gun’s crew to drag the guns into position. It is to the artillery, their precise and rapid firing, that we owe our immunity from attack of the large body of Coreans on our left flank; and saying this, what more can be said.
　By Lieutenant Commanders Wheeler and Heyerman, with two companies of sailors and five pieces of artillery, it is just to say the post of danger and honor was held, for to their hands was intrusted the safety of all who marched to storm the fort. They were equal to the task, and did well, punishing the Coreans severly by their well-directed fire, and finally caused them to retire in haste.
　To all the infantry officers great credit is due for the order, discipline, and effectiveness of their several commands, and the vigor, dash, and enthusiasm of their men speak highly of the ability displayed in handling, instructing, and instilling them with these most important qualities, which were tested severely before the enemy, and in storming and capturing his stronghold, “one of the gates of the kingdom.”
　To captain Tilton and his marines belongs the honor of first landing and last leaving the shore, in leading the advance on the march, in entering the forts, and in acting as skirmishers; chosen as the advanced guard on account of their steadiness and discipline, and looked to with confidence in case of difficulty, their whole behavior on the march and in the assault proved that it was not misplaced.
　To Lieutenant Commander W. S. Schley belongs the credit of organizing the expedition and carrying out the several details, which went far to prevent confusion and induce success. His arrangement of the boats, his superintendence of the various labors on shore, in destroying the guns and forts, encouraging the men and setting them a brave example in being the second in the fort at its storming, and being in readiness at all times to render assistance where most needed, render praise unnecessary. The facts of his labors and actions, judgment and system, speak for themselves. I commend him to your notice.
　Mr. Houston, the signal officer of the Alaska, and who was signal officer on shore, I must thank for his promptness, willingness, and alacrity; he it was that brought us near to the Monocacy, and very important and valuable assistance in more ways than one.
　Important services were also rendered by Messrs. Baylor and Howard, (mates,) who acted as aids and performed various other duties, and for their attention and zeal during the whole expedition they should receive some appreciate mark of favor, as they are both deserving young men; and this brings me to Assistant Surgeon William A. Corwin, who was constantly on the field, ready night and day to render assistance and to perform those labors of mercy that are so much needed on and occasion like this; he was frequently under fire, and deserves all the praise that can be accorded to a brave soldier.
　The results of the expedition may be summed up by saying that all orders received were executed, five forts or batteries, with their armaments and stores, destroyed, forty-seven colors and standards captured, some three hundred and fifty Coreans placed hors de combat, with a loss to ourselves of three killed and nine wounded.
　I have also, in conclusion, to state that, besides encountering a brave enemy, the natural obstacles were almost insurmountable. Having no guides to show the roads, if there were any, our success, considering the time engaged, seems almost a miracle of good fortune. I would also call attention to that part of Captain Tilton’s report that refers to some of the fixed ammunition for the Remington carbines, and would state that some of our howitzer ammunition was also defective.
　Appended are the reports of Lieutenant Commander Schley; Lieutenant Commander Cassel’s, marked B; Lieutenant Commander Casey’s, marked C; also, those of the officers of artillery and infantry; Dr. Corwin’s report of casualties, marked F; and programme of force, D.
　I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Commander, Commanding Land Force

Commander H. C. BLAKE, U. S. N.,
　Commanding Expedition against Corean Forts

UNITED STATES STEAMER BENICIA, (3d rate),
Isle Boisée, Corea, June 14, 1871

Sir:
　I have to report that the expedition, composed of six hundred and fifty sailors and marines, seven pieces of artillery, a corps of sappers and miners, and an ambulance party, supported by the United States steamers Monocacy and Palos, was towed to the scene of action against the Corean forts on the Salée River, in the boats of the squadron, by the Palos, and landed in admirable order at 12.30 p. m. on the 10th instant. The infantry was armed with the Plymouth, Springfield, and Remington rifles; the artillerymen with navy cutlass and Remington pistol; the sappers and miners and the ambulance party with the Remington pistol. On landing, the line of battle was quickly formed, the right wing under Lieutenant Commander Casey, and the left wing under Lieutenant Commander Wheeler. In order that assistance or support might be readily given to all parts of the line in the event of an attack by the enemy, a section of artillery was posted on the right and one on the left of the battalion, with three pieces in the center, all under command of Lieutenant Commander Cassel. The first fort was easily taken by the skirmish line of marines under Captain Tilton, and supported by the main body. This fort was found to contain twenty-eight cannon of about two or two and one-half inch caliber, all breech-loaders of old design. This fort commanding the second fort, a long line of breast-works mounting twenty-eight guns, among them two 24-pounders, of about the same size and design as those first taken, soon fell into our hands. The great guns of these two forts were dismounted, spiked, or broken up, the matchlocks, gingalls, mortars, and breech-pieces broken or thrown into the river, all ammunition and commissary stores burned. The works themselves were leveled with the ground, and all buildings used as cover for the enemy’s troops, stores, or ammunition were set on fire or otherwise destroyed. In fact the destruction was as complete as the sword, shovel, fire, and sledges could well make it.
　Owing to the great difficulty of bringing up the artillery, which was mired in the deep mud on the river-side where we landed, it was not used against the enemy at this point, but through the untiring energy and perseverance of Lieutenant Commander Cassel, it reached the field about 4.30 p. m. that day. The day being far advanced and the distance to the third fort too great to admit of a successful attack before night, the troops were bivouacked in a strong position, with the artillery so posted as to make an attack from a more enterprising enemy extremely hazardous to them.
　On the following morning, the 11th, the column was set in motion to attack the third fort. At 8 a. m. the skirmish line of marines, under Captain Tilton, entered this fort without resistance and dismounted and spiked thirty guns, some of which were 32-pounders. The walls of this fort were leveled and the buildings about it burned to the ground. From this point the enemy was discovered in force on a knoll about one mile distant to the northward, evidently determined to contest our advance and to harass our rear. After a short skirmish, during which a few shells from the artillery were thrown, it was determined to hold this force in check with Lieutenant Commander Heyerman’s and Master Drake’s companies, and one section of artillery under Lieutenant Snow, then advance on the enemy’s stronghold, Fort du Condé.
　Lieutenant Commander Wheeler, with three pieces of artillery under Lieutenant Mead, supported by one company of infantry, was charged with the important duty of securing the road by which the enemy was to retreat.
　To this end a hill was occupied within supporting distance of Lieutenant Commander Heyerman, and which commanded at the same time the western angle of Fort du Condé, and a number of shell were thrown from this point into their citadel.
　The main body, under Lieutenant Commander Casey, consisting of five companies of infantry, with one section of artillery, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Commander Cassel, was advanced, with a heavy skirmish line under Captain Tilton.
　The enemy’s redoubts on the hill immediately in front of the fort were soon cleared, and on the crest of this hill the line of battle was formed for the charge. The enemy appeared determined to resist with spirit, and at once opened a hot fire from their parapet. The section of artillery under Lieutenant Commander Cassel took position on the brow of the hill to the northward to cut off their retreat.
　About 12.30 p. m. the charge was made through a deep ravine, full 80 feet deep, with three hundred and fifty sailors and marines. The approach was clear of any covering, and the fire of the enemy most terrific and severe. Nothing could withstand the men. The impetuosity of the charge was met by brave men in the fort, who contested inch by inch, and who fought hand to hand. The honor of gaining the first foothold inside the fort fell to Lieutenant McKee, who was at once charged by the enemy. But a moment had elapsed until I gained the inside and went to his aid in his desperate fight with the enemy. In a moment he fell mortally wounded by a musket-ball in the groin and a spear-stab in the side. The same brave one who had speared McKee rushed upon me, but the spear passed between my left arm and my body, and before he could withdraw it for second trial, he was shot dead and fell lifeless at my feet. At this moment a number of officers had reached the fort, among them Lieutenant Commander Casey, Lieutenants Totten, McIlvaine, Master Brown, Captain Tilton, Lieutenant Breese, and others. After a desperate conflict, hand-to-hand for a few minutes, the enemy was driven from the fort at the point of the bayonet, leaving some one hundred and eight of his dead and wounded in and immediately about the fort. Seeing themselves defeated and beaten, the enemy retreated in great disorder to the river front.
　Master McLean gallantry threw himself with about thirty men in the road of their retreat, and engaged them in a short but severe conflict, in which the enemy lost about forty killed and wounded. Lieutenant Commander Cassel’s artillery then caught them in flank and punished them most severely with canister. Captain Tilton passed to the right of the fort and caught the enemy retreating along the crest of a hill which joins the two forts, and punished them very severely. At 12.45 the redoubts and fortifications, mounting one hundred and forty-three guns, were in our possession, and the enemy, estimated at several hundred, were in disordered flight, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands, numbering one hundred and forty-three. As many were killed and fell into the river, besides many wounded who drowned; I think their loss may be estimated at three hundred and fifty men.
　The redoubts and two forts to the right and to the left of Fort du Condé contained one hundred and forty-three cannon of various sizes and descriptions. A number of them in the water batteries were rifled cannon, resembling old French patterns, about 30-pound caliber. These guns, together with many matchlocks, were broken, destroyed, and dismounted. The walls of the forts were leveled, the magazines were blown up, and all stores burned. All buildings in and about the forts were destroyed by fire.
　I must not omit to mention the very excellent service performed by the sappers and miners, under Mate Levin, in clearing the way for the artillery, in dismounting guns, and in lending their assistance most cheerfully whenever and whenever required. Nor would I do proper justice if I failed to mention those men whom I recognized as the first to gain the inside of the fort.
　I recognized John Adams, boatswain’s mate; Otto Bruske, ship’s writer; John Kelley, sr.; John Brady, 2d ordinary seaman; William Higgs, ordinary seaman; George Johnson and James Carr, landsmen. There were other brave fellows from the Alaska and Colorado whose faces I cannot remember and whose names I could not ascertain; I do not doubt that the fullest praise will be accorded them by their company officers in their reports of this creditable victory.
　The officers of the whole battalion behaved with great gallantry and decision; it would require a better pen to praise properly or to do justice to their dash and courage.
　On the morning of the 12th, at daylight, after having occupied the field of battle eighteen hours, the entire force re-embarked in one hour, and returned to this anchorage in the Monocacy and Palos.
　During the forty-eight hours the forces were on shore five forts were taken, two hundred and sixty guns taken and destroyed, one battle fought, in which the enemy lost, in killed and wounded, about three hundred and fifty men, while our loss was three killed and nine wounded; and great quantities of ammunition, small-arms, and stores were taken and destroyed.
　Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. SCOTT SCHLEY,
Lieutenant Commander and Executive Officer,
Acting Adjutant General of Expedition

Commander L. A. KIMBERLY,
　Commanding Land Forces

UNITED STATES STEAMER ALASKA, (3d rate),
Off Isle Boisée, June 13, 1871

Sir:
　I have the honor to submit the following report of the two howitzer batteries under my command during the late expedition against the Corean works.
　The first battery, Lieutenant Snow consisted of the Benicia’s section, Master Schroeder, posted on the right of the battalion, and one section, Master Wadhams, posted on the extreme left, composed of one piece from the Alaska and one from the Colorado.
　The second battery, Lieutenant Mead, occupied the center, and consisted of one section of heavy 12-pounders, Ensign Bassett, and and one light 12-pounder, Mate Greenway, all from the Colorado.
　Upon the order to land at Morne Boisée, the boats were beached as quickly as possible, and the howitzers disembarked and dragged through the mud as rapidly as circumstances would permit.
　The nature of the ground at this point scarcely admitted of the passage of the infantry, and rendered the transportation of the guns almost impossible. Frequently the axles of the heavier pieces were completely buried, and it was only with the assistance of several companies of infantry, and by the indomitable spirit of the artillerymen themselves, that the batteries finally reached the position of the main body. The light piece of Lieutenant Mead’s battery was detached and sent to the advanced position of the marines, the remaining sections occupying their position assigned.
　Beyond the throwing of a few shells in the direction of a dropping gin-gall fire, nothing occurred during the night.
　During the advance of the following morning, the formation of the ground again rendered the passage of guns difficult in the extreme. Often it was necessary to widen the road, or rather the footway, and to carry the caisson for considerable distances. Here the sappers were invaluable, and it was only by the cheerful aid given by the commanding and company officers of infantry that the pieces were kept in their positions in the column. At about 10 a. m. the right section was pushed up to the skirmish line and shelled a position held by a number of the enemy on a high hill to the left of the line of march. The same section was then advanced with the skirmishers to a hill to the front and its place supplied by the left section, which was supported by A and F companies of the battalion. The battery in the center was then brought up with the main body and took position with the right section. From this point fire was opened upon the main point of attack, the redoubt above, Fort du Condé, the left section continuing its fire upon the position before mentioned. Upon the advance which followed, one piece of the right section was pushed up with the main force and was followed almost immediately by the remaining one.
　Before, however, it reached a position to open, the charge of the infantry was made and the work carried by assault. The precipitous formation of the ground made a direct advance impossible for the artillery, but in moving down the spur of the hills to the left, in order to reach the level ground, the advanced section was enabled to open with effect with canister and 1-second shrapnel upon a very considerable body of the enemy, which was in retreat along the beach in rear of the fort. This duty performed, the section was moved to the high ground to the left of the redout. During the final advance and assault of the infantry, the heavy battery with the left section, which was left in the rear, supported by companies A, B, and F, was employed in holding in check what has since been discovered to have been a large force of the enemy on the left flank.
　Upon the capture of the redoubt these guns, with their supports, were moved to the front and assigned position, the heavy battery in the center looking down the ravine, and the light section on the high ground to the left, commanding the valley and hills through which the march had been made.
　In the embarkation which took place on the following morning the pieces were withdrawn to the boats with celerity and without accident.
　In conclusion, I would state that though the force under my command had not the good fortune to take part in the gallant dash made by their comrades of the infantry, yet, by their cheerful and unwavering spirit under the natural difficulties by which they were surrounded, both officers and men, without exception, showed their entire devotion to the cause in which they were embarked.
　I inclose herewith the reports of commanding officers of batteries of the expenditure of ammunition in their commands during the operation.
　I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DOUGLAS CASSEL,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Commander L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. N.,
　Late Commanding Naval Battalion

UNITED STATES STEAMER COLORADO, (1st rate),
Off Isle Boisée, June 13, 1871

Sir:
　In compliance with your order, I respectfully submit the following report of the expenditure of ammunition by the battery of naval howitzers under my command, during the late expedition against the Coreans on the island of Kang-Hoa:
　For rifle howitzer, (heavy twelve): 28 shell, percussion; 29 shell, time-fuse; 2 canister.
　For heavy twelve: 34 shrapnel, 13-fuse; 17 shell 13-fuse; 9 canister.
　For light twelve: 17 shrapnel, 13-fuse; 5 shell, 13-fuse.
　This battery, consisting of three pieces from this vessel, was stationed in the center and manned by forty-eight men; the right section being in charge of Ensign Bassett, United States Navy; the left piece in charge of Mate Greenway, United States Navy.
　The conduct both of officers and men under my command was admirable; they were indefatigable in their exertions to surmount all obstacles, of which you know not a few were placed in their way by the roughness of the roads over which they were obliged to drag their guns,
　All of the equipments belonging to the howitzers were returned on board in good condition.
　I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MEAD,
Lieutenant, United States Navy

Lieut. Commander DOUGLAS CASSEL, U. S. N.,
　Late Commanding Artillery of Naval Battalion

UNITED STATES STEAMER ALASKA, (3d rate),
Boisée Anchorage, Corea, June 14, 1871

Sir:
　I have the honor to submit the following report of ammunition expended in the first battery (light 12-pound howitzers) during the expedition against the forts on Kang-Hoa Island, June 10 and 11, 1871:
　First section, Master Schroeder commanding, 17 shell, 18 shrapnel, 10 canister. Second section, Master Wadhams commanding, 14 shell, 6 shrapnel, and 1 canister. The firing was very accurate, and but few shells failed to explode.
　The commanding officers of sections speak of their men in the highest terms as showing endurance, courage, and cheerful alacrity in the performance of the heavy work allotted to them.
　Very respectfully,

A. S. SNOW,
Lieutenant, United States Navy,
Commanding First Battery of Artillery

Lieut. Commander DOUGLAS CASSEL, U. S. N.,
　Commanding Artillery

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP COLORADO, (1st rate),
Off Boisée Island, Corea, June 16, 1871

Sir:
　In obedience to your order, I submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the attack on the Corean fortifications. The command consisted of eight companies of sailors, two of marines, and one of pioneers, the whole numbering five hundred and eight rank and file. The men were supplied with sixty rounds of ammunition, two days’ cooked rations, and carried their blankets, made up in a roll, slung over the shoulder.
　On Saturday, June 10, we disembarked from our boats on a mud-flat, some three or four hundred yards to the southward of the first fort. The companies were quickly formed in line and advanced, the marines well ahead as skirmishers. Previous to starting I sent the pioneers to assist in landing the howitzers.
　On reaching the fort we found it had been hastily evacuated. Company D, Lieutenant McKee, and Company F, Master Pillsbury, were at once detailed to destroy the guns, and the rest of the companies, with the exception of the marines, were posted in line on the plateau, in rear of the fort, ready to resist any advance of the enemy. The marines took a position some distance to the right, and threw out pickets. In obedience to your order, I sent four companies to report to Lieutenant Commander Cassel, to assist in dragging the howitzers through the mud.
　On the arrival of the battery, Company A, Lieutenant Commander Heyerman, Company D, Lieutenant McKee, and Company E, Lieutenant McIlvaine, were detailed to support the different sections; the other companies were held in reserve. Sentinels were posted around the camps and pickets thrown out. Every precaution was taken to guard against a surprise. The marines, with one piece of artillery, held a strong position about a half a mile to the right, separated from the main camp by a swamp, and accessible only by a narrow path. About 11 p. m. brisk firing and shouting were heard in the direction of Captain Tilton’s camp. Beat the long roll, when the men fell in as promptly and quietly as though they had been veterans. The firing came from a body of Coreans a third of a mile beyond the marine pickets. After throwing a few shells in that direction from the center section, the firing and howling ceased. About 2 a. m. several shots were heard in the same direction; sounded the alarm, and the men fell in again. It turned out to be a false alarm, however, and the retreat was soon beaten.
　Sunday, June 11, at 4 a. m., beat the reveille. The men were mustered and ordered to get their breakfast, roll up their blankets, and prepare for the march. After breakfast Company C, Lieutenant Totten, with the pioneers under Mate Quinn, were sent into the fort to complete the destruction of the walls, buildings, and guns. A large number of gingalls and small breech-loading cannon were broken up, quantities of rice and dried fish destroyed, and all the huts and buildings used by the soldiers of the fort set on fire.
　At 7 a. m. I received your order to advance; formed line with two pieces of artillery in front, three in the center, and two in the rear. Owing to the narrowness of the road and hilly character of the country, our progress was exceedingly slow and tedious; frequent halts were ordered to give time for the pioneers to widen the road for the artillery to pass. From time to time companies were detached to assist in dragging the howitzers up hills and through the narrow defiles. As usual, the marines took the advance. They occupied the middle fort, known to us on the chart as Fort Monocacy, without opposition, the splendid practice from the Monocacy having cleared the enemy out. The fort was held by the marines until the battalion of sailors came up. Master Pillsbury was sent with his company to spike and destroy the guns. The battalion was halted until this work was effectually accomplished, when we again took up the line of march, the marines thrown out ahead as skirmishers. We had approached but a short distance when the enemy was discovered in large numbers on the crest of the hills in advance. The gallant McKee was ordered forward to deploy his company to the left of the marines, and Lieutenant Commander Heyerman and Master Pillsbury were sent to take possession of a hill on our left, followed by a section of artillery commanded by Lieutenant Snow. A lively firing was kept up along the line for some time with small-arms and the howitzers; the fire of the latter being directed more especially against a redoubt on a hill beyond the range of musketry, and around which there appeared to be a large force concentrated.
　The enemy disappearing beyond the hills, we again moved forward to the next hill, leaving Companies A and F and the section of artillery to hold their position and guard our rear. The next hill was taken without resistance. Here Lieutenant Commander Wheeler was left with three howitzers and Company B, Master Drake. This position was of vital importance to us. The enemy appreciating the value of it, concentrated a large force to attack, when Lieutenant Commander Wheeler called in Companies A and F, and the section of artillery from the adjoining hill, to re-enforce his position. The enemy, estimated at from four to five thousand, charged the position, but was most gallantly repulsed, with considerable loss. We moved on to the redoubt on the hill, (the great stronghold of the enemy), with the marines thrown out as skirmishers, and Company C, D, E, G, and H arriving at the brow of the hill nearest the redoubt, the column was halted and deployed along the crest, the marines on the extreme right, the other companies in the following order from right to left: Company H, Master Brown; Company C, Lieutenant Totten; Company E, Lieutenant McIlvaine: Company D, Lieutenant McKee, and Company G, Master McLean, on the extreme left. When all had taken their positions the order to charge was given; the whole line rose up amid a terrific fire of gingalls, and, with a yell, rushed for the redoubt, the company officers gallantly leading their men; each man appeared to vie with his comrade to be the first man in the fort, but the heroic McKee was the first to mount the parapet. There he stood for a moment, bravely fighting, single handed, against overwhelming odds, and at last fell pierced by both spear and bullet. Thus did the son follow the glorious example of the father, and like him die fighting and like him die fighting at the head of his men.
　It would be impossible to give the order in which the other officers entered the redoubt, they followed do closely. The conflict inside was of the most desperate character; our men fought, some with their cutlasses, others with their muskets and carbines, using them as clubs; the Coreans with spears, swords, stones, and even threw dust to blind us. While the charge was in progress Master McLean, observing the enemy retreating from the fort, hastily collected a portion of his company, and on the double quick moved it to the left to cut off their retreat. The enemy opened a heavy fire on him, and made two desperate attempts to rush past him; each time he drove them back with loss. At last he charged them with his handful of men. The enemy took refuge behind some rocks, and fought with desperation until they were all killed or captured. After the capture of the redoubt Lieutenant Commander Wheeler, with his command, was recalled and joined us. Our men were so exhausted from their long march and charge that a rest of an hour was allowed them, after which the work of destroying the works, guns, and firing the villages commenced, in which all the companies were engaged except Company F, which was on picket duty. The work accomplished by each company, and the lost of men especially mentioned for gallant conduct, you will please find in the reports of company officers, which I herewith inclose. Our force for the night was posted as follows: Company F, Master Pillsbury, with Company D, Master Chipp, held the second ridge to the westward of the fort, their pickets extending to the village; Company E, Lieutenant McIlvaine, supporting a section of artillery, with the two companies of marines, commanded by Captain Tilton and Lieutenant Breese, held the first ridge, their pickets extending to the right and left; Company A, Lieutenant Commander Heyerman, supporting three pieces of artillery, occupied a narrow ridge, commanding the ravine on the west face of the redoubt; Company C, Lieutenant Totten, and Company H, Master Brown, held the redoubt; Company G, Master McLean, supporting two howitzers, occupied the hill on the east face, his pickets well in advance; the company of pioneers, Mate Quinn, was camped under the south face, and acted as a guard to headquarters. The night passed quietly, except an occasional shot from the pickets near the burning village, probably at some straggler trying to make his escape. But the enemy made no demonstration in force.
　The next morning, the boats having been towed up, preparations were made for re-embarking. Company I, Captain Tilton, was left on the ridge in front, and Company K, Lieutenant Breese, held the redoubt. The other companies were drawn up in line facing the ravine.
　The artillery was first re-embarked, followed by the companies as their boats were ready, and lastly the two companies of marines. The re-embarkation was conducted in an orderly manner, without the slightest confusion or hurry. The battalion went on board the Monocacy, when the men were at once supplied with hot coffee. Arriving at our anchorage, near the flag-ship, we manned our boats and went to our respective ships. The force opposed to us in and around the redoubt is variously estimated at from four to five hundred, of which number two hundred and fifty were killed, fifty wounded, and six or eight made prisoners. We captured a large number of flags, which were sent to the flag-ship; also the large battle-flag on the redoubt, which was hauled down by Private Hugh Purvis, of the Alaska, and Corporal Brown, of the Colorado.
　During the expedition, the conduct of the entire command was, with one exception, unexceptionable. The men were full of zeal, vigilant on guard, and prompt in obeying orders. The marines were always in the advance, and how well they performed their part, I leave you to judge. Their conduct excited the admiration of all. I cannot express in too high terms my admiration for the gallant conduct under fire of the officers attached to my command, and their cheerfulness in executing orders under trying circumstances.
　Before closing my report, I would respectfully call your attention to Chief Engineer Henderson, who, though not attached to the expedition, asked a passage in my boat ashore, and on landing, volunteered to go with a portion of the pioneers to assist in getting the howitzers on firm land. The piece he was with was the first in position. He was always on hand to assist in any work where he could be of service. Mr. Holland, Captain Cooper’s clerk, was a volunteer, rendered great service by conveying orders to distant parts of the field, and when not so employed could be seen with a carbine on his shoulder in the ranks. When Lieutenant McKee fell, Master Chipp, form the Monocacy, was assigned to the command of his company, performing the duty assigned him with great zeal.
　Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Lieutenant Commander, Commanding Infantry

Commander L. A. KIMBERLY,
　Commanding Land Forces

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP COLORADO,
Boisée Anchorage, June 17, 1871

Sir:
　In obedience to your order, I respectfully make the following report in regard to the services performed by the men under my command in the late expedition on the Corean forts:
　From the landing and capture of the first fort (June 10) up to the time we advanced on the fort known as Fort McKee, I performed no detached service, but acted with Lieutenant Commander Casey in the position which had been assigned me ― that of lieutenant colonel of the battalion.
　On June 11, when we had reached a position nearly a mile directly in rear of the last captured forts, I was left command of the reserve, which consisted of one company of infantry, commanded by Master F. J. Drake, and three pieces of artillery, under command of Lieutenant W. W. Mead.
　While our advance were marching toward the citadel, the rifled howitzers were engaged in shelling it over the heads of our advancing forces. Immediately on our left were a number of Coreans with their heads just visible above the crest of the hill, firing occasional shots at us with gingalls. We paid very little attention to them at first, until their fire became more rapid, and I then noticed that their number was gradually increasing. Our howitzer ammunition being very low, I made signal to the Monocacy for a fresh supply, which was immediately sent and landed on a mud-flat below me. Not having men to spare to send down for the ammunition without greatly endangering our position, I made signal to Lieutenant Commander O. F. Heyerman (who had been left on a hill about a quarter of a mile in the rear) to leave his position and come to me, which he immediately did. By this means I was re-enforced by two more companies and two more pieces of artillery. As soon as Mr. Heyerman came up he reported there was a very large force of Coreans, amounting to between two and three thousand, coming across the hills in our rear. Immediately on the arrival of the other two companies I sent a number of men down to the river-bank for the ammunition, which was soon brought up to the top of the hill. The three companies of infantry which I now had were made to lie down out of sight of the Coreans, and the artillery was posted round the crest of the hill. It was evident now that the Coreans were gathering in force behind the hill in my rear, for where a few minutes before only a few heads were visible, now the whole crest of the hill was lined with heads, and they were keeping up a pretty lively fire, but not at all a dangerous one, as they were distant about five hundred yards. Twice they made a rush over the brow of the hill, but a few shell from the howitzers drove them quickly back. The hill which we held commanded the only approach to the forts ahead, with which our advance was now engaged. In order for the enemy to pass us and attack our advance in the rear they would have been obliged to pass through a valley which was completely very much afraid.
　As soon as the enemy in the rear saw that our advance had stormed and captured their forts, they withdrew from their position and retreated; as soon as they got out of cover of the hill which they had been holding, I opened fire on them with the howitzers, until they were out of range, scattering them like sheep in every direction.
　Great credit is due Lieutenant Mead and Snow, who commanded the artillery, for without the artillery the position which I held would have been perfectly at the mercy of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy; it was only by the aid of the artillery that I was enabled to hold the enemy in check. As soon as I was satisfied that the whole force in my rear had been scattered, I at once left my position and marched up to the forts, which were now in our possession. This is the only detached service which I performed during the expedition.
　Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. K. WHEELER,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Rear-Admiral JOHN RODGERS,
　Commanding United States Asiatic Squadron

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP COLORADO,
At anchor off Isle Boisée, Corea, June 16, 1871

Sir:
　In conformity with your directions, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the marines of the Asiatic fleet in the late expedition against the Coreans:
　On Saturday, the 10th instant, the guards of the Colorado, Alaska, and Benicia, numbering one hundred and five, rank and file, and four officers, equipped in light marching order, with one hundred rounds ammunition and two days’ cooked rations, were embarked from their respective ships and towed up the Salée River by the United States ship Palos. Upon nearing the first of a line of fortifications, extending up the river on the Kang-Hoa Island side, the Palos anchored, and by order of the commanding officer all the boats cast off and pulled away for the shore, where we handed on a wide sloping beach, two hundred yards from hugh-water mark, with the mud over the knees of the tallest men, and crossed by deep sluices filled with softer and still deeper mud. After getting out of the boats a line of skirmishers was extended across the muddy beach, and parallel to a tongue of land jutting through it to the river, fortified on the point by a square redoubt in the right, and a crenulated wall extending a hundred yards to the left, along the river, with field of grain and a small village immediately in its rear. The fortification had been silenced by the cannonade from the United States ship Monocacy and the steam-launches, and the garrison fled through the brush and fields, firing a few shots as they retired at a distance. The marines, by order, then advanced on the place, sweeping through the grain-fields and village, meeting no opposition, and remained in possession until the main body came up, when we were again ordered to push forward, which we did, scouring the fields as far as practicable from the left of the line of march, the river being on our right, and took a position on a wooded knoll, covered with hemispherical mounds, and commanding a fire view of the beautiful hills and inundated rice-fields immediately around us, and distant about half a mile from the main body. A reconnoissance was then made toward the next fort ― a square work of hewn granite foundation, with a split rock, mud, and mortar rampart, crenulated on each face, with a front of about thirty paces ― and a messenger dispatched to headquarters with the information that the road was clear and passable for artillery. Pickets were posted on the flanks of our little position, five hundred yards to the right and left ― a rice-field inundated being in front ― and a Dahlgren 12-pounder planted so as to command the junction of the only two approached, which the commanding officer had ordered up to us as a support.
　An order having been sent to hold our position till morning, we bivouacked with our arms by our sides, dividing our force in three reliefs, one of which was continually on the alert. No incident occurred during the night except rapid firing of small-arms and howling from a hill inland from us, and about a third of a mile distant. Two of three shots from the artillery with the main body were fired across the left of our picket, in the direction of the noise, which presently ceased.
　Sunday morning, the 11th of June, the main body came up, and we received orders to push forward, which we did, and after reaching the fields in the rear of the next line of fortifications, we threw a line of skirmishers across the peninsula of hills on which the fort stood, and after the main body came up we advanced toward the rear face, with two-thirds of our guards in reserve. We entered this second place, after reconnoitering it, without opposition, and dismantled the battlements by throwing over the fifty or sixty insignificant breech-loading brass cannon, all being loaded, and tore down the ramparts on the front and right face of the work to the level of the read of the banquette.
　The ramparts consisted of a pierced wall of chipped granite, with a filling of earth in the interstices and coated over with mortar, giving it the appearance of being more solid than it really was. The cannon were rolled over the cliff into the water by Bugler English, without much trouble, who climbed down for this purpose. I cannot give the weight, but the bore was not over two inched diameter. A photographer came on shore from the Monocacy and succeeded in taking a negative picture of the piece. We were then ordered by the commanding officer to push forward and find the road leading to our objective point, and to cover the flanks of the main body, which we did with two-thirds of the marines deployed, the remainder in reserve.
　We scoured the scrubby woods and fields of grain, stirring up two or three unarmed native refugees from the village we had just passed, who were not, however, molested; and, after progressing half a mile, down deep ravines and the steepest sort of hills, were fired upon from a high ridge a little to the left of us, up which our skirmish line cautiously wheeled, and upon reaching the summit saw the enemy on a parallel ridge opposite, who blazed away at us with their gingalls or match-locks, their black heads popping up and down the while from the grass, but only one spent bullet struck us, without any injury. A piece of artillery was here brought up from the valley beneath us, by direction of Lieutenant Commander Cassel, by superhuman exertions on the part of his men, and several shells landed among the enemy grouped on a knoll, scattering the party, when our skirmish line pushed on down the narrow range leading to the circular redoubt ― our objective point, and known to us as the citadel, being the third work of the line of fortifications ― the main body following column of fours.
　Upon reaching a point a third of a mile from this work, a general halt was ordered to rest the men, who were greatly fatigued after their comparatively short, although extremely steep, march; the topography of the country being indescribable, resembling a sort of “shopped sea,” of immense hills and deep ravines lying in every conceivable position. We then advanced cautiously, with our line of skirmishers parallel to the right face of the redoubt, which was our point of attack, concealed from view from the enemy, and took position along the crest of a hill one hundred and fifty yards from him, closing intervals to one pace on the right skirmisher; the line extending along the ridge, our right resting in a path leading to the redoubt, upon which were planted about twenty-five banners in single file, a few feet apart, and at right angles to our line, the first banner being only four paces from our fight skirmishers. Thirty paces in front of us was another ridge, parallel to the one we now occupy, but in order to reach it the whole would be exposed to view. The main body came up and formed close behind us. The banners seemed to be a decoy, and several of us went from our right, took about fifteen of them, which drew a tremendous hail of bullets from the redoubt, which relaxed in half a minute, when away we pushed, availing ourselves of the opportunity to get to the next ridge, accomplishing the move with the loss of only one man, a marine from the United Sates ship Alaska, although for several seconds exposed to a galling fire, which recommenced immediately after the rush began. Our lines were now only one hundred and twenty yards from the redoubt, but the abrupt slope of the hill and the weeds covered us very well. The firing now commenced rapidly from both sides; ours increasing as the men got settled comfortably, and their fire was effective, as the forty or fifty killed and wounded inside the redoubts show. The firing continued for only a few minutes, say four, amidst the melancholy songs of the enemy, their bearing being courageous in the extreme, and they exposed themselves as far as the waist above the parapet fearlessly; and as little parties of our forces advanced closer and closer down the deep ravine between us, some of them mounted the parapet and threw stones, &c., at us, uttering the while exclamations seemingly of defiance. One of these little parties, the very first to enter the redoubt, was led by our beloved messmate, the noble, the brave, the heroic McKee, who fell pierced with a bullet in a hand-to-hand struggle on the ramparts.
　The yellow cotton flag, about 12 feet square, with a large Chinese character in black on the center, thus: 帥, which flow over the fort, was captured by the marines. It was torn down by Corporal Brown, of the Colorado’s guard, by my direction, while Private Purvis, of the Alaska’s guard, was loosing the halliards at the foot of the very short flag-staff. Private Purvis, of the Alaska’s guard, had his hand on the halliards a second or two before any one else, and deserves the credit of the capture.
　Corporal Brown deserves equally with him to be honorably mentioned for his coolness and courage. The command, to a man, acted in a very creditable manner, and all deserve equal mention. The officers of the marines were Lieutenant Breese, Mullany, and McDonald, who were always to be found in the front.
　The wounded were soon attended to by the surgeon’s corps, who removed them to the Monocacy, lying in the stream. The place was occupied all Sunday night, the artillery being posted on the heights, and commanding the rear approaches, the men bivouacking with their companies on the hills. Early Monday morning the entire force re-embarked on board the Monocacy, the marines being the last to leave.
　The re-embarkation was accomplished in a masterly manner, in the space of an hour, no confusion whatever occurring, although the current was very strong, the rise of the tide being nearly 20 feet. The Monocacy then steamed to the fleet, some ten miles below, where we all rejoined our respective ships.
　Of the marines there was one killed, and one severely wounded; the first being Private Dennis Henrahan, of the Benicia’s guard, and the wounded man Private Michael Owens, of the Colorado’s guard, shot through the groin as he was charging toward the redoubt, falling about forty paces from the parapet. The accouterments and arms of the guard of this ship were returned, and no loss of property occurred. The expenditure of ammunition was sixteen hundred cartridges, about forty rounds each man.
　I trust it will not be considered out of place in this connection to mention that I picked up from the field great numbers of copper-shell cartridges, unexploded, although the shell bore evidence of having been well struck by the firing-pins. Upon filing the heads of some of these shells, so as to expose the tinned cup holding the fulminate, I found the appearance of oxidation around the cavity holding the fulminate, and on the inside of several cases I found the tinned surface of the cup entirely gone, and one sixteenth of an inch of what looked like the rust of iron filling the bottom of the cup. Upon inquiry I found the men complained of the cartridges packed un paper boxes, while no complaint was heard from them who had been furnished with cartridges in wooden boxes.
　From the great number of unexploded cartridges I saw on the field, although having a deep indentation in their heads from the pins, I am led to think that it will be dangerous to trust to any of the cartridges in the fleet, packed in paper boxes, and marked “Frankford arsenal, 1869,” and I believe that at least 25 per cent of them are utterly worthless.
　I would respectfully suggest that this fixed ammunition be thoroughly tested, and the good separated from the worthless. For curiosity I today got an unopened box of each kind, and with a Remington carbine, fired them with the following result. Not a single cartridge packed in the wooden box failed to explode, and not one required to be struck the second time. Fifty per cent of those packed in the paper boxes failed altogether, and several of those that did explode required to be struck twice, and, in two instances, even three blows were struck before explosion, showing that the sensitiveness of the fulminate had materially deteriorated, probably by some galvanic action; at all events, it was bad. One rifle carbine was shown me which seemed to have a weak mainspring, as it worked stiffly and failed to explode a cartridge. I examined the arm and found the apparent weakness of the spring to be owing to the gummed oil on the large pin upon which the hammer revolves; the stiffness thus occasioned over so great a surface prevented the hammer from operating with sufficient force, the strength of the spring being too much spent in overcoming the friction occasioned by the gum. Upon removing the pin, wiping and putting it back in its place, a matter of a few moments, the piece worked perfectly.
　One carbine burst about three inches from the muzzle, but it was evidently not caused by improper welding, as the fracture presented and irregular surface. The barrel of this gun on the outside looked as if it had been pushed into stiff mud, and probably a long wad of mud was inside the barrel when the rupture occurred.
　Very respectfully, yours,

McLANETILTON,
Captain U. S. Marine Corps,
And Fleet Marine Officer, Asiatic Fleet

UNITED STATES STEAMER BENICIA,
Boisée Island, Corea, June 5, 1871

　For the information of all officers, the following organization and arrangement of forces will prevail in the expedition against the Corean fortifications:
　Signal officer, Mr. Houston; Commander L. A. Kimberly, commanding land forces; Lieutenant Commander W. Scott Schley, adjutant general; Mate A. K. Bayler, aid.
　Infantry. ― Lieutenant Commander Casey, commanding; Lieutenant Commander Wheeler, second in command; Company A, Lieutenant Commander Heyerman, Ensign Clarke; Company B, Master Drake; Company G, Lieutenant Totten; Company D, Lieutenant McKee; Company E, Lieutenant McIlvaine; Company F, Master Pillsbury; Company G, Master McLean; Company H, Master Brown and Mate Callender; Company I, Captain Tilton, Lieutenant McDonald; Company J, Lieutenant Breese and Mullany.
　Artillery. ― Lieutenant Commander Cassel, commanding; Lieutenant Snow, right battery; Lieutenant Mead, left battery; Master Schroeder, right section; Master Wadhams, left section; Ensign Bassett, right center section; Mate Greenway, left center section.
　Pioneers. ― Mate Quin, commanding; 20 men from Colorado; 8 men from Alaska; 8 men from Benicia.
　Hospital force. ― Passed Assistant Surgeon Wells and Assistant Surgeons Latta and Corwin; 6 men from Colorado; 3 men from Alaska; 3 men from Benicia.

Regimental Formation

　The launches and boats with howitzers will land two boat lengths apart.
　The second line of boats will land to the right, except Colorado’s fourth cutter, which will land to the left of the launch on her immediate right.
　On landing the infantry officer commanding will throw out skirmishers to clear away opposition. The artillery will then land and proceed to form in rear and follow after infantry until a sufficient space is obtained to form in the regimental formation above prescribed. The order of march will be in column of forms, unless a sufficiently clear space will admit of company front, viz:
　Artillery to be around wish cutlass and pistol.
　Sappers and miners armed with pistols.
　Hospital force armed with pistols.
　Thirty rounds of shrapnel, 10 rounds of shell, and 10 canister to each gun will be carried in the boats.
　Fifty additional rounds, in the same proportion to each gun, will be sent to Monocacy and Palos, 60 rounds of ammunition, for small-arms, will be carried by each of the infantry, 100 additional rounds will be sent on the Monocacy and Palos.
　Sappers and miners will carry intrenching tools.
　Each man will carry his blanket, made up in a roll, over shoulder, and his pot slung to hit belt. Men will be provided with two days’ cooked rations.
　The order of landing is to prevent confusion, and should the current derange the plan proposed, the boats will land as nearly as circumstances will admit in the order prescribed.
　After the landing party are on shore the pulling boats will be handed off and anchored in the most safe and convenient place for re-embarking the force, if it should be necessary.
　Lieutenant Commander Picking will command the steam-launches.
　By order of the commanding officer.

W. SCOTT SCHLEY,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, Adjutant General

Approved June 8, 1871.

JOHN RODGERS,
Rear Admiral Commanding United States Asiatic Squadron

ASIATIC FLEET,
UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP COLORADO, (1st rate),
Boisée Anchorage, Corea, June 12, 1871

　The commander-in-chief has pleasure as well as pride in making [known] to the officers, seamen, and marines of the Asiatic fleet his high [satisfaction] at the gallantry and endurance evinced by them in the recent operations against the Coreans on Kang-Hoa Island.
　On the 1st instant, while the Monocacy, Palos, and four steam launches were engaged in surveying, they were suddenly assailed by a storm of missiles from masked batteries on the shore. With the greatest prompt [_____] and gallantry this treacherous attack was met and the enemy driven from his guns and his position.
　The Corean government having failed to make any apology for this murderous attack, on the 10th instant an expedition, consisting of a landing force detailed from the Colorado, Alaska, and Benicia, under Commander L. A. Kimberly, with the gun-boats Monocacy and Palos, all under Commander H. C. Blake, commanding in chief, was dispatched to punish the enemy. The operations of the 10th and 11th instant, which resulted in the capture of five smaller forts, culminated on the 11th in taking, by assault, the enemy’s stronghold, located in a most formidable position, at a very dangerous part of the river, and desperately defended.
　Two hundred and forty-three of the enemy’s dead were counted within and around these works, and fifty flags were taken. The works were formidable, not only from the natural features of the land, from shoals and violent currents in the river, but were rended artificially so, by hundreds of weapons of various kinds placed by the enemy for their defense. The gallant band which encountered and overcame the perils of the navigation, which fought its way, against vastly superior forces, through mud and marsh, over precipitous hill and across difficult ravines, and finally stormed and captured the enemy’s stronghold, is worthy of all praise.
　To one and all the commander-in-chief expresses his thanks, and the pride he feels in commanding such a body of officers and men.
　He makes known to the commanding officers of vessels his obligations for the efficient drill and organization which have produced the reliable force composing the Asiatic fleet. To those brave men now suffering from their wounds he tenders his hearty sympathy.
　While rejoicing in the success achieved by our arms, he expresses his profound sorrow for the loss of those gallant men who gave up their lives in vindicating the honor of their flag. While deploring their loss, let us preserve the memory of their bravery.
　Among the honored dead whose loss we deplore, is Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee, who, gallantly leading his men to the assault, fell mortally wounded in the center of the citadel which he was the first to scale. His memory is the more endeared to us because we knew him, and his gallantly will be cherished by all as a bright example to the service.

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COLORADO, (1st rate),
Salée River, Corea, June 15, 1871

ADMIRAL:
　In the engagements of June 10 and 11, with the cordon of forts leading to Fort du Condé, and the fort itself, I have to report the following casualties:

KILLED

　1. Hugh W. McKee, lieutenant United States Navy, flag-ship Colorado.
　2. Seth A. Allen, landsman, flag ship Colorado.
　3. Dennis Hanrahan, marine, United States ship Benicia.

WOUNDED SEVERELY

　1. C. J. S. Wells, passed assistant surgeon, flag-ship Colorado.
　2. Michael Owens, marine, flag-ship Colorado.
　3. William F. Lukes, ordinary seaman, flag-ship Colorado.
　4. Charles Roget, landsman, flag-ship Colorado.
　5. William Webb, seaman, United States ship Alaska.

WOUNDED SLIGHTLY

　1. James F. Merton, carpenter, Colorado.
　2. Samuel F. Rogers, quartermaster, Colorado.
　3. Alexander McKenzie, boatswain’s mate, Colorado.
　4. Charles Wright, ordinary seamen, Colorado.
　5. William McGoolen, landsman, Colorado.

　Assistant Surgeon Latta and several others suffered from sun-stroke during the two days’ operations, but have since recovered. None of the wounded above mentioned seem to be in any immediate danger. It gives me great pleasure to state that the two men belonging to the United States steamer Alaska, wounded in an engagement with the same forts on the 1st instant, viz, James H. Cochran, ordinary seaman, and John Summerdyke, ordinary seaman, are rapidly servant,

HENRY O. MAYO,
Surgeon of the Fleet

REAR-Admiral JOHN RODGERS, U. S. N.,
　Commanding Asiatic Squadron.

UNITED STATES STEAMER ALASKA, (3d rate),
Boisée Island Anchorage, June 16, 1871

ADMIRAL:
　In obedience to your order of this date, I respectfully submit the names of the following men belonging to this vessel who captured flags inside Fort McKee:
　Hugh Purvis, private, United States Marine Corps, commanding general’s flag; John Kelley, private marine; H. M. Toleman, private marine; J. B. Butler, private marine; James Martin, chief boatswain’s mate; Joseph Carroll, captain maintop; John McDevitt, ship’s corporal; Morman C. Roberts, captain mizzentop; James Smith, captain mizzentop; W. C. Colquehoun, coxswain; John Thompson, seaman; Richard Andrew, seaman; George Duncan, seaman; Thomas Woods, ordinary seaman.
　Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HOMMER C. BLAKE,
Commander, United States Navy

REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS, U. S. N.,
　Commander-in-chief Asiatic Fleet.

UNITED STATES STEAMER BENICIA, (3d rate),
Boisée Island, Corea, June 16, 1871

Sir:
　The following are the names of the marines of this ship who captured flags in the late attack on Fort McKee:
　Corporal Thomas H. Baker, Private Daniel Barry, Private John Bourke, Private Charles C. Collins, Private William Dewees, Private George McIntyre, Private Michael McNamara.
　I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. A. MULLANY,
Second Lieutenant, Commanding Guard

Commander L. A. KIMBERLY, U. S. N.,
　Commanding United States Steamer Benicia.

UNITED STATES STEAMER BENICIA,
Off Boisée Island, June, 16, 1871

　List of men in Company G who captured flags:
　J. Kelley, seaman; B. Charles, ordinary seaman; Ed. Mead, seaman extra; J. Andrews, ordinary seaman; M. Brickley, captain forecastle; J. Brady, 2d, captain forecastle, ordinary seaman; M. Anderson, seaman; J. Brady, 1st, ordinary seaman; William Tate, ordinary seaman extra; P. Engen, seaman; John Lawrence, ordinary seaman.
　Respectfully, &c.,

T. C. McLEAN,
Master, United States Navy

Commander KIMBERLY, U. S. N.

UNITED STATES STEAMER ALASKA, (3d rate),
Isle Boisée Anchorage, Corea, June 30, 1871

Sir:
　It becomes my duty to bring to your notice the commandable conduct of Hugh Purvis, private marine, serving on board United States steamer Alaska, who was one of the first to scale the walls of the fort, and who captured the flag of the commanding officer of the Corean forces, on June 11, 1871.
　Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HOMER C. BLAKE,
Commander, United States Navy

Hon. GEO. M. ROBESON,
　Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

Approved of medal. Private Purvis was first at the generalissimo’s flag staff.

JOHN RODGERS

UNITED STATES STEAMER BENICIA, (3d rate),
Off Chifoo, China, July 5, 1871

Sir:
　I herewith transmit the following-named men, who distinguished themselves in the attack on the Corean fort, on the river Salée, on June 11, 1871, by the following acts, viz: Private Marine Dougherty, of the guard of this vessel, for seeking out and killing the commanding officer of the Corean forces; Private Marine McNamara, of same guard, for gallantry, advancing to the parapet and wrenching the matchlock from the hands of one of the enemy, and killing him on the parapet.
　Also, the following-named men deserve mention, at least in general orders, for being among the very first in the citadel, and repelling a charge made on Lieutenant McKee, after he was wounded, and seizing and wrenching the spears and other arms from the hands of the Coreans, and delivering a well-directed fire which forced the enemy to fall back from that portion of the citadel where the gallant McKee fell, viz: John Adams, boatswain’s mate; Otto Bruske, ship’s writer; John Brady, 2d, ordinary seaman; William Higgs, ordinary seaman; George Johnson, landman, and James Carr, landman.
　I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. A. KIMBERLY,
Commander

Hon. GEO. M. ROBESON,
　Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.