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근대한국외교문서

조선 문제 관련 청불(淸佛) 관계 및 양국 교섭 과정 보고

  • 발신자
    R. Alcock
  • 수신자
    Stanley
  • 발송일
    1866년 12월 13일(음)(1866년 12월 13일)
  • 수신일
    1867년 3월 8일(음)(1867년 3월 8일)
  • 출전
    TNA, FO 881/1505
Peking. December 13, 1866
My Lord,
 THE inclosed correspondence between the Prince of Kung, the Ministers of the Tsung-li-yamen, and M. de Bellonnet, the French Chargé d’Affaires, arising out of the Corean massacre of Roman Catholic missionaries and their converts, has been forwarded to all the Legations by his Imperial Highness, as a protest, apparently, against the language of M. de Bellonet and the injurious charges conveyed in his letters to the Prince accusing the Chinese Government or certain of its members of complicity in the acts of the Coreans.
 The Prince, in his covering letter, after recapitulating the substance of M. de Bellonet’s correspondence, particularly refers to the absence of all proof of any foundation for the injurious charges, and appeals to the other Representatives of Treaty Powers at Peking, inviting an expression of their opinion.
 Neither I nor my colleagues, the Representatives of America, Russia, and Prussia, have felt it expedient to take this course. Whatever judgement may be formed of the grave charges brought by M. de Bellonnet or the language employed, any formal intervention at the request of one party in a matter of dispute without the consent of the other would only serve to envenom the discussion. I have, however, had some conversation with the French Chargé d’Affaires on the subject, which satisfied me that he believed credit was to be attached to various rumours conveyed to him, through the missionaries or their converts chiefly, as to the complicity of the Chinese Government. He conceived this was shown by indications of previous knowledge that a massacre of Romanist missionaries and their converts was contemplated, and he was determined to adhere to the line of policy which his letters indicate.
 What that policy is, and how far it may be sanctioned or is likely to be carried out by the French Government, are questions of such serious importance to the interests of all the other Treaty Powers that I deem it essential to put your Lordship in possession of whatever tends to throw light upon them.
 M. de Bellonnet makes no secret of what his view are or the policy he advocates. He has often, in conversation with Mr. Wade and his colleagues, declared his conviction that the dismemberment of the ere is inevitable : and he thinks that the sooner it takes place the better, because only then can any reconstruction on a better basis take place, for nothing is to be hoped from the existing dynasty and effete system. He has no scruple, therefore, in precipitating the event by insisting upon decide progress and changes for which those at the head of affairs are wholly unprepared, and with little heed as to what may be the immediate consequences or danger to the Government and its rule over the provinces. Nor does he seem to regard with any fear the possible contingency of an indefinite period of anarchy consequent on the fall of the present Government and dynasty. One or more of the European Powers, with a handful of troops, and a few Sous-Lieutenants to preform the function of Government in the provinces, might suffice, he conceives, to maintain order, recognize the whole system of government, and administer it over the empire, with its eighteen provinces, each larger and more populous than many European kingdoms.
 In close connection with these sweeping views for the regeneration of China-the first element of which is the destruction of all existing forms-note must be taken of a standing grievance in the perpetual contravention of Treaties by the provincial authorities, and the impossibility of obtaining redress from the Central Government. This applies, it is true, to all the Treaty Powers, but with France, the assumed protectorate of the Roman Catholic missionaries, scattered far and wide through the Empire, with fixed habitations in the interior far away from all supervision of Consuls, introduces and additional and exceptional class of grievances, bringing their own peculiar conditions of mutual wrong and irritation. Other Governments have ever-recurring complaints of injury to their subjects in their material interests, and feel in common the hopelessness of removing the grounds, as well as the weariness of vain efforts to obtaining redress by diplomatic means. M. de Bellonnet does not stand alone, therefore, in his dissatisfaction at the folly of those who, instead of smoothing the way for the gradual progress of change by reasonable and safe concessions, treat it as if it could be permanently kept at bay, and meet it with an opposition of which the only effect can be to hurry it on too quickly and too far. But there is this essential difference, even as regards material wrongs, between the French Representative at Peking and his colleagues. Delays and tergiversations prolonged from month to month and from year and year, have undoubtedly an exasperating effect on all ; only with M. de Bellonnet, as he wrote to me some time ago, “Pour nous Francais, qui sommes un peu moins patients que les Chinois, six mois de silence est l’équivalent d’un refus ;” whereas his colleagues, feeling that great material interests are at stake, and that a vast commerce is bound up with the maintenance of peaceable external relations and a fixed Government within, are less disposed to regard delay as a refusal to do justice, and to peril all by prompt recourse to violence and coercion. The sense of responsibility, which sobers them and keeps in check all important impulses, is unfortunately wholly wanting in the case of the French, who have no large trade to injure or to risk, and no material interests of any real importance in China. Their grievances are nearly all of a putative character, and exclusively due to the voluntarily assumed protectorate of Roman Catholic missionaries and their converts. I say of their converts advisedly ; for it is impossible to doubt that these missionaries do in effect, if not avowedly, seek to establish under the ægis of France a veritable protectorate over the thousands of Chinese subjects whom they claim as converts. Not content with their own exemption from the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities, under an exterritorial clause, which is in itself a source of constant humiliation to the country, they strive unceasingly to withdraw their converts and protégés from the legitimate authority of the territorial sovereign. Thus a struggle full of bitterness and hostile feeling is constantly maintained on both sides : the one trying to obtain a right of interference and protection over large classes of Chinese subjects, and the other stoutly contesting an encroachment on their rightful authority by all means at their command-sometimes by craft, and at others by violence, according to their weakness or their strength, but always with a consciousness of right, and no question except as to a choice of means. The Central Government at Peking is probable more sensitive than the distant provincial authorities to the danger and responsibility of acts tending to embroil them with the great Protecting Powers so constantly invoked in aid by the Romanist missions. But who can doubt what it approves in secret of all resistance to the priestly domination sought to be established, to the subversion of all territorial sovereignty and independence of a foreign Power ?
 This same battle, with some little modification in form, has been waged in our own and every Protestant country in Europe in times past, and has not ceased even at the present day. It seems, indeed, to be inevitable wherever the two forces are in presence. It has been well and truly remarked that, “among a people so careless of religion and religious faith as the Chinese, the attempt to inculcate a dozen new religions would be regarded with callous indifference did the missionaries confine themselves to the simple apostolical routine of proselytism. It is only when they awaken jealously by mixing in matters temporal that they become objects of dislike and suspicion to the governing power.”
 To this desire to obtain temporal influence as a means to spiritual ends, under the belief that the minds of people would be more easily swayed if political power were brought to the aid of argument, is to be traced the present danger to all peaceable relations. The Romanist missions think to strengthen their own cause, by showing that they have power to protect their converts from all action of their own authorities. That the latter should resist such attempts is in the nature of things, and unavoidable. To this and no other cause is to be attributed the extermination of Romanism in Japan nearly three centuries ago, with the massacre of thousands of converts ; and the similar persecution and expulsion which took place about the same era, and later, in Chinese. The more recent massacres in Saigon, about it was annexed, and in Corea, read very much like chapters out of the same book.
 The Roman Catholic missions are provoking precisely the same results now, trusting to France to avert the catastrophe by drawing the sword in their defence, and revolutionizing the country if not conquering it. It cannot be matter of surprise, therefore, that these grievances of missionaries, alleged spoliations and oppressions of their converts, and even acts of violence directed against their own persons, and occasionally costing a life, should meet with tardy recognition, and still more reluctant reproval or redress from the Government here. And it is precisely these cases that create the greatest exasperation at the French Legation, not the less that there is known to be a certain national pride in the protectorate assumed by France, and a very considerable party in that country who sympathise entirely with the aims and work the missionaries. It is said, I know not with what truth, that 7,000,000 French subjects, exclusive of large numbers in Belgium, Italy, and Spain, subscribe funds to maintain the Romanist missionaries in China.
 The prestige and honour of France, as the avowed protector of these pioneers of the Roman Church, are engaged to shield them ; and armed with the consciousness of this, and their own zeal in the propagation of the faith, I fear it is too true that, in the spirit of the crusaders, they look more to the sword than the cross to remove all obstacles and make their way clear, quite willing themselves to incur all the risks of martydom in establishing a new order of thins more consonant with their hopes and aims.
 It requires no accumulation of details and facts to show how pregnant with danger the operation of these causes must be throughout a vast Empire like China, torn by civil dissensions, badly governed, under the weak administration of a child Emperor, and still further paralyzed by the ever-present fear of foreign aggression and forcible interference.
 It is easy to understand, under such conditions, how, in the case of the priest murdered in Kuei-chow, five years ago, and another in Sze-chuen last year, no promise given with regard to the punishment of the guilty has been kept ; and, no less easy to comprehend, that each post brings a fresh crop of complaints and grievances, from every quarter, of missionaries on collision with local authorities, of persecutions directed against their isolated congregations, and of wrong and injury suffered by the one or the other. How far these may be well or ill founded it must, in the majority of cases, be exceedingly difficult for the Chinese Government to ascertain, were they ever so well-disposed to arrive at the truth ; and hardly less so for the French Representative at Peking, or to establish his conclusion upon satisfactory evidence. Where one party is eager to find or to make causes of offence, and the other equally ready to resent and resist pretensions, it may be safely concluded that the wrong is not always on one side.
 Mr. Wade in the memorandum of a conversation with Wēnseang which I inclosed in my despatch No. 7 of September 7 last, dwelt much upon the irritation felt by the French on account of the ill-treatment of the Romish missionaries, and on the natural increase of this irritation consequent on the Corean massacres ; and even admitting the unreasonableness of the missionary complaints in many cases, the excusableness of anger where the Chinese Government had behaved as in the cases already cited of two missionaries put to death, the Minister, without denying that some of the missionary complaints might be well founded, obviously felt that little account was taken by the foreign Legations of all the deeper grounds of complaints his Government had against these fomentors of discord and subversive action ; and I think that it is only fair in reference to the endless complaints which find their way to Peking from the Roman Catholic missionaries of wrong and ill-treatment in all parts of the Empire, to call attention to the inclosed brief account of a journey of 900 miles by two English Protestant missionaries through the western provinces, so lately the scene of civil conflicts and disturbance. It is certainly a significant fact that in all this prolonged journey, extending over several weeks, in regions rarely visited by foreigners, they never once met with serious ground of complaints, and, when they had occasion to appeal to the local authorities they invariably met with attention and civility.
 It is not necessary, however, to assume that the Romanist missionaries have no bonâ fide ground of complaints. How far they provoke any injuries suffered by unwarrantable pretensions and usurpations of authority not properly attaching to their mission, is another thing. If it were a question of tolerance, even Protestant Powers might be willing to incur some risk and damage in their material interests for an object so highly appreciated by all. But it is not tolerance which is denied them, but something quite different and thoroughly antagonistic. It is too much therefore to expect that Protestant nations, or Russia with its Greek Church, should submit to have all their interests imperilled in order that ultramontane doctrines and Papal rule should be established in China under a French Protectorate. That which France herself steadily resists at home cannot with any show of consistence be imposed on other nations, either by missionaries or her troops. Still less can England. America, or Prussia, all Protestant States which have maintained the opposite principle through centuries of war and effort, see with equanimity an enemy no longer able to find a resting-place in Europe make a safe lodgment in in the Far East with the aid of French bayonets, at the expense of every interest they possess in those regions. It is not a question of theology, or the relative merits of Protestantism and Papacy. Whether the latter, cleared of some of its non-essentials and corruptions, might not exercise a more beneficial influence among Asiatic races, and be more readily accepted by them than any existing form of Protestantism, amy fairly be considered a matter of opinion, in which most earnest and sincere believers in the divine origin and authority of Christianity may entertain different views. It is not the spiritual but the temporal bearing of ultramontane theories and operations which affects Government.
 And as regards this country more especially, apart even from the ulterior tendencies and schemes of the Romanist missions, there can be no doubt, I think, that when M. Lagréné, the first French Minister in China, introduced a clause in his Treaty stipulating for the restoration of all land or houses which, on the expulsion of the Roman Catholic missionaries in the beginning of the eighteenth century, were confiscated to the State as having belonged to the different missions all over the country, he planted the seed for a plentiful and never-failing crops of contentions and heart-burning with the Chinese authorities, by which in the end I believe all the property they may acquire in virtue of the Treaty will have been dearly purchased. But apart also from this fruitful source of ill blood and popular hostility, the special feature attaching to the Romanist pretensions lies in the fact that it is impossible for the Chinese Government ever to satisfy them. To yield to their claims for authority, and a protectorate over Chinese subjects, would be for the Emperor to abdicate in effect, and renounce the rights of sovereignty over his own people. Therefore, so long as a powerful foreign State like France undertakes to support these Romanist missions, and fight their battles, there can be neither peace nor security.
 The grievances of other foreign Powers, those more especially who have large commercial interests engaged, are of a very different type, and would seem to admit of far easier redress, although none can be obtained, or only of so tardy and imperfect a character that it amounts almost to a total denial of justice. If there were any question of coercion and the policy of restoring to it, it would surely be in such cases that the strongest argument might be found where the wrong or injury is undeniable, and the benefit any success would be common to all.
 I happened lately to have occasion to refer to the correspondence of my predecessor Sir Frederic Bruce, in 1863, with the Prince of Kung, and I could not help being struck with the stereotyped forms of complaint reiterated then for the twentieth time, year after year, and as applicable now as them without the alteration of a word. In a memorandum of the substance of observations addressed to the Prince of Kung by Sir Frederic Bruce on the 5th of June, 1863, the following passages occur, and are so entirely to the point that I cannot forbear quoting them as they stand : -
 “These expectation have not been realized. At several of the parts the Treaty is daily broken in matters great and small, and the Central Government, if not unwilling, shows itself unable to enforce a better order of thins. The orders sent by the Foreign Board when Sir Frederic Bruce complains are not carried out, either because the local authorities do not stand in awe of the Foreign Board, or because they do not believe that the Foreign Board issues them in earnest.
 Questions of this sort have again and again been brought forward by Sir. F. Bruce. The Foreign Board has gone through the form of issuing instructions thereupon, but causes of complaint remain as they were, either because the local authorities do not fear or because the Foreign Board do not care. Seeing that none of the authorities whose conduct has been complained of have been punished or removed ; that officials notoriously hostile to foreigners have been appointed to place where they have increased opportunity of indulging their anti foreign tendencies, while in one or two instances, as at Canton, Newchwang, and Foochow, officials of friendly dispositions have been withdrawn, Fir F. Bruce is induce, however, reluctantly, to infer that if the Imperial Government be not adverse to foreign intercourse, it is, at all events, indisposed to do what is necessary to teach the people and local authorities that China is sincerely desirous of friendly relations with foreign Powers.”
 And again, in a letter dated June 16 of the same year, Sir Frederic remarks : “Complaints are incessant from almost every port of entire indifference on the part of the authorities to the provisions of the Treaties affecting transit duties, passports, the free employment of Chinese, the acquisition of building sites, and the recovery of debts.”
 “I do not deem it worth while to go more into detail, because there is no case before me in the catalogue of those still unsettled which could not have been disposed of without reference to the capital and which could not now be disposed of in a few days were the local authorities persuaded of the fact that the Treaties form part of the law of the land, and that neglect or violation of their provisions will be denounced and punished as breaches of the law.”
 This is in fact the summary of a whole series of despatches, and were I to write as many more on the present state of out relations I could nor more completely or accurately describe it. And this was more than three years ago.
 The Government of the United States of America and of Great Britain are the most seriously aggrieved, because their commerce and material interest of various kinds are so immeasurably greater than those of other nations in China. Russia has no doubt large interest territorial and commercial on the northern and western boundary, and, as I learn from its Representative, they are not without grounds of complaints, aggravated by the same inertness or indisposition to do justice. But the greatest amount and multiplication of cases requiring redress fall necessarily to the share of Great Britain and America, from the greater magnitude of interests and more numerous points of contact with the Chinese. On them also, therefore, is laid in the present state of affaires the greatest burden of patience and forbearance.
 And it is this long animity which is made a subject of reproach to their Representative by French Chargé d’Affaires. Impatient of delay and eager to strike as the readiest means of obtaining the satisfaction he despairs of otherwise securing, and strong in the belief that it is only by such action China can be either promptly or effectually shaken out of the rut of old prejudices and retrograde ways, he condemns all reliance on milder means as lamentable weakness as well as the worst policy.
 To Great Britain more especially he disposed to attribute, by her willingness to add to the difficulties of the present Government by any action calculated to weaken its power or influence with its own subjects, and her generally conciliatory spirit, the resistance which he meets with in all his efforts to obtain prompt redress ; and he conceives our moral support to the existing Government is not only a mistake but a main cause of an indisposition to change or progress, which all, nevertheless, are pressing upon it as necessary to its own security and advancement. That he should also attribute our caution or reluctance to force them on in the paths of innovation against their will and before they are satisfied of its prudence or wisdom, to an all-engrossing and sordid care for our own interests to the prejudice of all civilization or progress in this country, will hardly be matter of surprise. Nor should I allude to it not that undoubtedly these opinions are communicated to his Government, and whatever may be the degree of influence they may be calculated to exercise upon the French Executive, it is only right that Her Majesty’s Government should be in a position to act upon the knowledge of the views and motives attributed to them, as well as those maintained by the French Representative in support of a policy diametrically opposed to that which they desire to see followed in this country.
 I can only say in conclusion that I consider the Romanist missions, and the action of the French in their support, the greatest danger to our interests in China and the continuance of good relations with either people or Government ; and no less certainly, in my opinion, the most serious impediment to any improvement in material civilization. It is impossible to follow the conversation with the Chinese Minister Wēnseang, the most intelligent and liberally-disposed member of the Yamên for Foreign Affairs, and not see that the one predominant idea which presented itself to his mind whenever railroads, telegraphs, or other European innovations were in question, was the fear of opening a door to further interference and dictation on the part of the French under pretext of vested interests.
 M. de Bellonnet may possibly believe that it would only require firmness and resolution on the pert of the Treaty Powers, or even one of them if the others did not by their support and sympathy neutralize the effect, to compel the Chinese Government to enter at once on a course of reform and innovation, and to render prompt justice in all cases of wrong inflicted on foreigners by the provincial authorities. He may think that, without any resource to arms, all the calamities with which the empire is threatened by the continuance of abuses and vain efforts to perpetuate a feeble and utterly corrupt administration might thus be averted to the great benefit of Chinese and foreigners alike. And if not, yet the best and safest policy would be to dictate, not to temporize, and, other means failing, to use coercion and put the whole empire under tutelage, as dependent States are in India. He has certainly so expressed himself on more than one occasion when speaking on the subject to me and to others.
 That a French Minister should deem such a system as France might establish an undoubted again to any other nation is not perhaps unnatural ; but the Representatives of other Powers may be excused if they place less implicit trust in a régime of Sous-Lieutenants or Prefects for the government of 400,000,000 of an Eastern race, whose language there are not twenty Frenchmen can either speak or understand.
 There is no empire in the world with so vast a population or so entirely homogeneous in race, language, customs, and religion, and it may well seem strange that France, which in the recent declaration of her Emperor proclaims the indisputable right of nationalities to form themselves in unity, should be the most active agent, by her Representative here, for the disintegration or dismemberment of China as a means of advancing good government and civilization.
 But, as I have already remarked, the interests are too great for a hazardous or experimental policy ; and the field of operations is on too vast a scale. We have nearly as strong reasons as the Chinese for being very slow in departing from the status quo, unsatisfactory as this may be ; for any great change during the minority of the Emperor, as I have already pointed out in a recent despatch, is sure to be attended with equal risk to all material interest. It is much more difficult than many suppose to improve an Oriental Government, owing to the badness of the instruments by which improvement is to be carried out. And this, if all others were wanting, is a strong argument in justification of their obstinate adherence to custom and routine in preference to innovation.
 On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that great and tangible benefits accrue to foreign nations under existing Treaties, however imperfectly in many instances their conditions are fulfilled. These advantage, it is quite true, are not without certain drawbacks ; but it is impossible to maintain that the injury resulting is either very great in extent or serious in its bearing on the whole results. And the endeavour to remove them by the summary action advocated by the French Representative in connection with views and aims of the Romanist missions in the interior, would be simply to sacrifice a great and substantial good to escape a comparatively small evil, and for at best a very doubtful future gain. It would be, above all, to abandon every hope of improvement in this generation, or of progressive changes by more rational modes of proceeding.
 This is the view equally entertained by my colleagues and myself, who see more to fear than to hope from any innovations forced upon either the people or the Government by foreign influence. We are of in opinion, that the more immediate result of any such attempts would be anarchy and revolution, with the total destruction of a valuable and flourishing trade, which, notwithstanding all shortcomings of the existing Government, and many real and constantly recurring grounds of complaint, continues to prosper and increase. However small the hope of any rapid or spontaneous improvement, or poor the chances of progress either in civilization or good government in the present aspect of affairs, we are satisfied they would be infinitely less under the pressure of foreign coercion or dictation, while the injurious effects to be anticipated are altogether incalculable.
 The one question, therefore, is, which policy shall prevail ? If the Romanist missionaries in the interior and the French Representative at Peking are allowed to pursue the course they deem best, it will very certainly not be a policy of forbearance or non-interference, but one of menace and coercion, leading rapidly to acts of war, and possibly to dismemberment. It rests with the other foreign Powers to determine how far such action on the part of France is compatible with their common interests, or the preservation and enjoyment of Treaty rights in China ; and if judged to be adverse to both, by what means a more temperate and pacific line of conduct may be secured.
I have, &c.
(Signed) RUTHERFORD ALCOCK
별지: Inclosure 1
 
The Prince of Kung to Sir R. Alcock
관련문서 조불(朝佛) 문제의 국제 공론화 시도 【英譯文】
별지: Inclosure 2
 
M. de Bellonnet to the Prince of Kung
관련문서 조선에 대한 청조의 종주권 부정, 조선 국왕 폐위 및 조선 침공 선언
별지: Inclosure 3
 
The Prince of Kung to M. de Bellonnet
관련문서 프랑스 함대의 조선 원정 계획 통보에 대한 회신 【英譯文(英國)】
별지: Inclosure 4
 
M. de Bellonnet to the Prince of Kung
Monsieur,
Peking, le 21 Octobre, 1866
 J’ai l’honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse Impériale la notification officielle du blocus de la rivière de Séoul et des côtes occidentales de la Corée par les Forces Navales de Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français. Je prie votre Altesse Impériale de vouloir bien donner à ce document toute la publicité possible afin que nul n’en ignore, et que les intérêts des Chinois qui trafiquent avec la Corée soient entièrement sauvegardés.
J’ai, l’honneur d’être etc.
(Signé) Henry de Bellonnet
“한강 봉쇄 통보”와 같음
별지: Inclosure 5
 
The Prince of Kung to M. de Bellonnet
관련문서 무력 행위 자제 및 사전 진상 조사 제안 【英譯文(英國)】
별지: Inclosure 6
 
M. de Bellonnet to the Prince of Kung
관련문서 총서(總署)의 사전 조사 제안의 거절 사유 및 조선 침공의 정당성 주장
별지: Inclosure 7
 
The Prince of Kung to M. de Bellonnet
(Translation.)
 THE Prince has read with great astonishment the despatch received from M. de Bellonnet on the 4th day of the 10th moon (November 19, 1866), charging in its general purport the Chinese Gorvernment with a desire to take the part of and protect Corea.
 In the 6th and again in the 9th moon the Prince addressed two despatches in reply to the Chargé d’Affaires of France. The Prince’s reasons for writing as he did in those replies were, that as France and Corea could not engage in hostilities without both sides suffering loss and injury to life and property, his Highness could not sit by and watch the proceeding without moving. He could not but (endeavour) as an intermediary to arrange the difficulty in the hope of preserving the lives of the subjects of both countries.
 The Prince was actuated by the best of motives ; he is excessively grieved, therefore, to read the despatch under acknowledgment, in which the Chargé d’Affaires openly, and in writing, gives expression to certain suspicions he has been pleased to form, founded on the one-sided statements of a menial attendant, and the totally groundless (lit., shadowless, soundless) gossip of the streets and lanes. The Chargé Affaires completely ignores the goodness of the Prince’s intentions, and even suspects (the Chinese Government) of having other designs(i.e., moving troops to the aid of Corea),
 With reference to the remarks in the despatch under acknowledgment on the sending of officials by Corea to Peking, and by the Chinese Government to Corea, the Prince has to observe that this intercourse between Corea and China is a usage of long standing, and not simply an affair of to-day. The Envoys sent by Corea this year to Peking and the officer sent by China to Corea were commissioned to perform certain ceremonial duties that have obtained from of old, which China could not now renounce because France was at war with Corea.
 As to the statement that China is selecting troops to assist Corea and fight on her side, the Prince would remark that if the State were employing troops (for this purpose) the circumstance would be publicly known and perceived by all.
 Whether China is or is not acting as alleged is a point patent in itself, without the need of argument to establish it. But the despatch under acknowledgment asserts as a fact (that China is so acting), thus deliberately, in addition (to the other statements) casting wrongful imputations (on the Prince).
 M. de Bellonnet also states distinctly in his despatch that his information is derived from rumor. Now, a rumor is a statement without proof ; and is it a proper principle of international intercourse to take as proofs of a charge statements destitute of proof ?
 M. de Bellonnet’s inability to recognize the Prince’s good intentions, and his casting imputation at will (upon his Highness) are points it is unnecessary to dispute further about ; but as the despatch under acknowledgment seriously concerns the peaceful relations of the two countries, the Prince has to make this reply, setting forth what is right in the case.
 A necessary communication, &c.
 (No date)
별지: Inclosure 8
 
The Ministers of the Yamên to Sir R. Alcock
(Translation)
 A Short time ago the despatches that had passed between this office and M. de Bellonnet, the French Chargé d’Affaires, on the Corean affair, were forwarded in copy to the British Minister. A further letter on the same subject has just been received from M. de Bellonnet, to which the Yamên has replied.
 Copies of this letter and of the reply the Yamên begs to forward herewith to the British Minister for his perusal. The Ministers are also writing to M. de Bellonnet, informing him (of the step now taken), and are sending at the same time a copy of the two letters to all the other Foreign Ministers.
 With best wishes and compliments, &c.
 10th moon, 25th day(December 1, 1866).
별지: Inclosure 9
 
M. de Bellonnet to the Minister of the Yamên
관련문서 공문을 왜곡하여 각국 대신에게 조회문을 발송한 것에 대한 항의
별지: Inclosure 10
 
The Minister of the Yamên to M. de Bellonnet
관련문서 조불(朝佛) 문제 조회문을 각국 공사관에 발송한 것에 대한 해명 【英譯文(英國)】
별지: Inclosure 11
 
Memorandum by Mr. Brown of a Voyage in the North of China made by Messrs. Williamson and Lees
 Mr. WILLIAMSON, of Chefoo, a missionary agent of the Bible Society, and Mr. Lees, of Tien-tsin, a member of the London mission, have recently returned from a trip which they have made in company to Si-ngan-fu, the capital of the Province of Shensi.
 Si-ngan-fu is distant from Peking, their point of departure, about 900 miles, in a south-westerly direction. The journey was performed all the way by land, and with the ordinary covered carts of North China. It occupied some seventy days going and returning.
 The chief object the missionaries had in view in reaching Si-ngan-fu was to examine in what state the famous tablet of the Nestorian Christians, erected towards the end of the eighth century A.D., at present was. Rumours had reached Peking and the coast that it had been recently destroyed by the Mahometan rebels ; but Messrs. Williamson and Lees found it still existing in a perfect state of preservation. The figure of the Cross and the Syriac characters on the tablet were still perfectly distinct. The temple in which the monument formerly stood was situated outside the walls of the city, and had been completely destroyed by the Mahometan brigands ; but the monument itself had been spared, and left standing in its original place.
 The travellers passed in a diagonal line through the Province of Shansi, which lies on the western side of Chihil, the Province in which Peking is situated. Shansi is intersected by ranges of hills, which leave broad fertile valleys between them ; coal and iron being everywhere most abundant. Indeed, the whole province, both hills and valleys, seems to rest on beds of coal. It was sold everywhere at a copper cash a “catty”-say, about 7s. to 8s. a ton. Both bituminous and anthracite coal was seen, and the quality appeared excellent.
 Shensi, separated from its eastern neighbour, Shansi, by the Yellow River, has been thoroughly laid waste by the Mahometan rebels, but was showing faint signs of recovery. The population is sparse, compared with Shansi and Chihli.
 Messrs. Williamson and Lees were everywhere informed, and they made constant inquiries both of natives and of the Roman Catholic missionaries they occasionally met with, that the Mahometans who devastated Shensi were without organization or political motive. They consisted simply of bands of brigands, each under its own independent head. The capital, Si-ngan-fu, had never fallen into their hands.
 Messrs. Lees and Williamson travelled throughout their journey without molestation or other inconvenience than what arose from the curiosity of the inhabitants, who had never before seen a foreigner in foreign costume. Any little difficulty or delay, such as will be met with on a route not hitherto openly travelled over by foreigners, bringing with them all their peculiarities of dress, habits, and mode of living, were easily got over by the production of the Consular passport, or an interview with the local officials, who, as a rule, were readily accessible and civil.
 Their chief object being to do missionary work, Messrs. Lees and Williamson lost no opportunity of publicly preaching in every town and populous village they passed through. They were invariably listened to with perfect good temper by crowds of people, and no interference was met with on the part of either the people or the officials.
 They further succeeded in selling (not in giving away) over 20,000 volumes of Christian books in the Chinese language.
 The travellers had intended returning through the province of Honan by the city of Kai-fêng-fu, where the settlement of Chinese Jews was discovered some years ago. They found, however, that all communication south of the Yellow River was cut off by the Nienfei rebels ; they were obliged, therefore, to return by their original route.
 The above is the substance of a statement made by Mr. Lees on the evening of the 26th November, a few days after his return, to his missionary brethren in Peking, at which I was present.
(Signed) J. McL. BROWN
Peking, December 1, 1866

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이름
the Prince of Kung, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonet, M. de Bellonet’s, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, M. Lagréné, Frederic Bruce, the Prince of Kung, Prince of Kung, Frederic Bruce, Frederic Bruce, F. Bruce, F. Bruce, Frederic, Wēnseang, M. de Bellonnet, The Prince of Kung, R. Alcock, M. de Bellonnet, the Prince of Kung, The Prince of Kung, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, the Prince of Kung, The Prince of Kung, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, the Prince of Kung, The Prince of Kung, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet’s, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, M. de Bellonnet, WILLIAMSON, Williamson, Williamson, Lees, Williamson, Lees, Williamson, Mr. Lees
지명
Peking, America, Russia, Prussia, Peking, Saigon, Corea, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, China, China, Kuei-chow, Sze-chuen, Wade, China, England, America, Prussia, France, Canton, Newchwang, Foochow, China, China, Russia, Great Britain, America, China, Great Britain, India, France, France, China, China, la rivière de Séoul, Corée, Corée, Corea, The Prince’s, France, Corea, Corea, Corea, Peking, Corea, Corea, China, Corea, Peking, China, Corea, China, France, Corea, China, Corea, China, Chefoo, Tien-tsin, Si-ngan-fu, Province of Shensi, Si-ngan-fu, Peking, Si-ngan-fu, Peking, the Province of Shansi, Peking, Shansi, the Yellow River, Shansi, Chihli, Si-ngan-fu, the province of Honan, Kai-fêng-fu, Yellow River, Peking
관서
the Chinese Government, the Chinese Government, the French Government, the Chinese Government, the Chinese Government, The Government of the United States of America, the Yamên for Foreign Affairs, the Chinese Government, the Chinese Gorvernment, the Chinese Government, the Chinese Government, the Yamên, the Yamên
기타
Romanist missionaries, the Roman Catholic missionaries, Roman Catholic missionaries, the Romanist missions, The Roman Catholic missions, the Romanist missions, the Foreign Board, the Foreign Board, The Foreign Board, the Foreign Board, the Roman Catholic missionaries
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