August 19, 1959

TO : His Excellency the President
FROM : Vice-Foreign Minister
SUBJECT : The problem of Korean residents in Japan: Observation of formulas for solution
In the Korea -Japan talks, three alternative formulas are considered for solution of the problem of Korean residents in Japan.
The first formula is to receive repatriation of all the Korean residents in Japan if Japan pays due compensation for them, and those who do not wish to be repatriated to the Republic of Korea are deemed no longer nationals of the Republic of Korea. It is impossible, however, to force all Korean residents in Japan to come back to the Republic of Korea. By this formula, less than 100,000 will presumably come home; then the Japanese Government may attempt to deport as many Koreans as possible to the nothern part of Korea ; a great number of Korean residents would apply successfully or unsuccessfully for naturalization into Japanese. Aside from our national sentiment, the problem of Korean residents in Japan would be settled once and for all, and our Government would be no longer responsible for their problem. But it cannot be a good alternative.
The second formula is to demand that Korean residents in Japan be generally accorded permanent residence, and those who do not desire to remain in Japan are repatriated to the Republic of Korea ; or that unless Korean residents in Japan are repatriated to the Republic of Korea, they are accordcd permanent residence as nationals of the Republic of Korea. This constitutes an essential structure of our position since 1952. This could be a standard position for us unless there is no problem of Japan's deportation of Korean residents in Japan to the communist north. Accordingly, this formula does not provide ways and means to block Japan's deportation scheme, because the Japanese Government takes it that the Korea -Japan talks are competent to deal with those who desire to remain in Japan and those who desire to be repatriated to the Republic of Korea, and that those belonging to neither of these two can go anywhere under the pretext of free choice of residence. This formula could be an ideal alternative only if the Japanese Government has bona fide intention to settle the issue.
The third formula is to settle the issue taking into careful consideration the malicious intent motivating the Japanese Government to make the present approach. In this formula, the issue is broken into three problems: (a) problem of those desire repatriation to the Republic of Korea ; (b) problem of those who desire permanent settlement in Japan ; and (c) problem of those who do not desire to be repatriated to the Republic of Korea nor desire to remain in Japan. Japan's deportation scheme is to dispose unilaterally of the third of these three. With signing the so-called Calcutta agreement, Japan demonstrated once again its determination for this unilateral disposal of the problem as scheduled.
If by this formula the Japanese side is persuaded that problems (a), (b) and (c) are closely interrelated to one another, and therefore, should be simultaneously settled, we may be able to check Japan's attempt to deport Koreans. Furthermore, if our Government invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to participate positively and equally in settlement of these three problems, this Committee may lose reason why it should proceed with problem (c) alone; if it wants to be impartial, the Committee cannot but withhold its role in the deportation plan. As our immediate target is to check the implementation of the Calcutta agreement in and after November, this year, hesitancy of the ICRC would be a serious obstacle in the way of the Japanese attempt. By this formula, we cannot go without United States help, and a proceeding of this formula would be greatly facilitated if the U.S. goes so far as providing a special aid fund for resettlement of the Korean repatriates to the Republic of Korea. In this connection, U.S. Ambassador Dowling clearly told me on July 17 to the effect that "the U.S. Government would offer to assist in obtaining compensation, probably in a lumpsum payment, from the Japanese Government for certain Korean residents if ROK -Japanese agreement on repatriation seems possible" (please refer: My report KPO 248). This U.S. suggestion would materialize only it the whole differences of views between the two Governments are adjusted. But the most controversial debate between our Government and the United States Government is centered around the problem of ICRC participation. Therefore, if we employ the third formula, there is high possibility that we can proceed with our policy in close cooperation with the U.S. As for compensation to be paid by the Japanese Goverment - payment of unpaid wages for Korean laborers, compensation for forced draftees of war-dead, etc. - the issue will be taken up separately as claim items at the Committee on Korean Claims of the talks.
It is indispensable and urgent for us to map out a basic line of a draft agreement to be presented to the Japanese side and to the ICRC.
If the above-mentioned general idea meets Your Excellency's approval, I will submit more datailed recommendation, re-contact the U.S. side, conduct press campaign along this line, brief our position to all mission chiefs and so on. For Your Excellency's reference, I am enclosing herewith a tentative draft of ESSENTIALS OF DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN.

Most respectfully,